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ABSTRACT
This dissertation focuses on managerial and operational challenges associated with product return
management and CLSC network design. The possibility of product return plays an important role in
consumer’s purchase decisions. It also motivates firms to extend their forward-only supply chain net-
work structures to a Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) network and handle both forward and reverse
flows of products. While the configuration of the CLSC network is a complex problem comprised of the
determination of the optimal locations and capacities of factories, warehouses and collection centers,
this problem becomes even more complex under the potential regulations on carbon emissions.
This dissertation follows a three-paper format. With a focus on product return management, the
first paper studies the roles that pricing and return policy play in the product exchange process for
refurbished products. We first apply netnography to study consumer attitudes, general opinions and
experiences concerning refurbished electronics purchases, and then propose an analytical model that
considers customers’ purchasing and return behavior as a result of the firm’s decisions regarding the
pricing and return policy for refurbished products. The numerical results suggest that sellers should
deliberately consider the market segmentation conditions, consumer valuation, and cost factors when
choosing the appropriate price and return policy for refurbished products.
The second and third paper focus on different aspects of CLSC network design. The second paper
investigates a problem to design facility configurations that are robust to variations in possible carbon
regulations and their cost and constraint implications. We establish a two-stage, multi-period stochastic
programming model to include uncertain demand and return quantities and then extended it to incor-
porate the uncertainties in carbon regulation policy by the robust optimization method. We propose a
hybrid model to account for either carbon tax or cap-and-trade regulatory policies and derive tractable
robust counterparts under box and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets. Implications for network configuration,
product allocation and transportation configuration are derived. We also present computational result-
s that illustrate how the problem formulation under an ellipsoidal uncertainty set allows the decision
xmaker to balance the trade-off between robustness and performance.
The third paper formulates and solves an integrated model for product return management and
CLSC network design considering uncertain carbon cost. We build a robust optimization model to ad-
dress the carbon cost uncertainty, and develop a piecewise linear approximation for the nonlinear profit
as a function of the refund. The results of the robust model are compared with those of deterministic
models where no or only nominal carbon cost is considered. Extensive parametric analyses illustrate the
impact of the cost, revenue and consumer profile parameters on the optimal refund, profit and network
topology.
1CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Product returns are an essential part of the exchange process between firms and consumers. Large
retailers can have return rates that exceed 10 % of their sales and the annual costs of commercial returns
exceed $100 billion (Atasu et al., 2008). For this reason, many firms tend to view product returns
as necessary evils, preventing them from recognizing potential value of those activities. A critical
challenge for managers is to understand how a return policy, that allows refunds for any reason, affects
the consumer purchase decision as well as firm’s overall profit. For particular type of product (e.g.,
a refurbished product), such understanding might be critical to enhance the value added by recovery
activities.
Meanwhile, product returns have motivated firms to plan their supply chain structures to handle both
the forward flows of products to consumers and the reverse flows from consumers back to the firm for
reprocessing. This leads to the idea of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) management. According to
Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009), CLSC management focuses on “the design, control, and operation
of a system to maximize value creation over the entire life cycle of a product with dynamic recovery of
value from different types and volumes of returns over time ”(p.10). As the network design is one of the
most important strategic decisions in firms’ planning and operation, a firm that wishes to proactively
design a CLSC needs to consider all the possible factors that will affect the outcomes of its decisions.
In recent decades, concerns over global climate change are increasingly focusing attention on both
the fuel costs and the carbon emissions that result from transporting goods. Although subject to political
vagaries, regulation of carbon emissions is becoming inevitable. For example, in 2005 the European
Union instituted a carbon emission trading scheme (EU ETS) for the energy-intensive industries with the
aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20% below 1990 levels (Bohringer et al., 2009).
2Also, the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme (NZ ETS) was introduced in 2009 to reduce the
carbon emissions in that country (Jiang et al., 2009). Australia’s government also announced a carbon
tax plan, aimed at lowering carbon by discouraging the use of fossil fuels and increasing investment
in renewable energy (Siriwardana et al., 2011). Those emission regulations aim to eventually reduce
substantial emission in all economic sectors, of which transportation is a major source of emissions.
According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 33.2% of carbon emission are from the
transportation sector (EIA., 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that several countries including the
United States, Japan and Canada are discussing the implementation of cap-and-trade systems that would
include the transportation sector. The EU ETS does not include road transport but does cover the
aviation sector in 2012 (Flachsland et al., 2011).
Thus, a firm that needs to design a CLSC network that involves heavy logistic activities should
anticipate possible carbon regulations. Moreover, the firm should understand that the recovery activities
are also triggered by the pricing and return policies set by the firm. Depending on the firm’s role in a
CLSC, it might be interested in different aspects of its management:
1. Product return management: for sellers (either retailers or manufacturers) who sell directly
to the consumer, the decision maker might be interested in understanding how the purchasing
and return behavior would be affected by the return policy as well as how to optimize the return
related process.
2. CLSC network design: for the manufacturers who are responsible for collecting the returns from
existing retailer, the decision maker might be interested in how to design the CLSC network when
carbon emission regulations are taken into consideration. Also, how to design a network that is
responsive to retailers’ demands and returns?
3. Integration of product return management and CLSC network design: for the manufacturers
who own the retail store or otherwise have the control over the return policy, the firm might be
interested in how to combine the product return policy with CLSC network design decisions to
improve profitability.
The goal of this dissertation is to provide insights regarding managerial and operational challenges
associated with product return management and CLSC network design. New insights are derived by
3considering both issues together. The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows: For the
product return management problem, we combine qualitative and quantitative research methods to veri-
fy some existing assumptions concerning refurbished products, and we also bring a marketing perspec-
tive to the problem of pricing refurbished products through a focus on factors related to the demand
faced by the seller. For the CLSC network design problem, we explicitly address the effects of uncer-
tain carbon emission regulations on the CLSC network configuration by incorporating two such policies
into a hybrid model. Also, we model the CLSC network design problem with the combination of both
robust optimization and stochastic programming methodologies. The carbon regulation parameters
characterized by prices or tax rates are modeled with uncertainty sets while the demands and returns are
represented by discrete probabilistic scenarios. Finally, we contribute to the literature by formulating an
integrated model for product return management and CLSC network design subject to uncertain carbon
cost. The extensive numerical results improve our understanding of the effect of various parameters
on both problem aspects. In addition, it contributes to a solution method designed for models with
quadratic terms as well as ellipsoidal uncertainty.
1.2 Thesis Structure and Overview
This thesis is structured as follows: it consists of three main chapters, preceded by this general
introduction and followed by a general conclusion. Each of those main chapters is a journal article,
with the first two under review and the third in preparation for submission.
The second chapter, titled “Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Refurbished Products Consid-
ering Tactical Consumers”, focuses on understanding the roles that pricing and return policy play in the
product exchange process for the refurbished products (Gao and Ryan, 2012). This chapter first uses
netnography to study consumers’ attitudes, general opinions and experiences concerning refurbished
electronics purchases, and then develops an analytical model that considers the customer’s purchasing
and return behavior as a result of the firm’s decisions regarding the pricing and return policy for refur-
bished products. The results suggest that sellers should deliberately consider the market segmentation
conditions, consumer valuation, and cost factors when choosing the appropriate price and return policy
for refurbished products. The combinations of either low price with relatively strict return policy or
4high price with lenient return policy appear to be preferable under a wide variety of conditions. Even
though this study looks at a special product type (refurbished electronics), it sheds some light on the
optimal design of the return policy for more general product types.
The third chapter, titled “Robust Design of a Closed-loop Supply Chain Network for Uncertain Car-
bon Regulations and Random Product Flows”, addresses a multi-period capacitated closed-loop supply
chain (CLSC) network design problem subject to uncertainties in the demands and returns as well as
the potential carbon emission regulations (Gao and Ryan, 2011b). This chapter extend the deterministic
setting in Gao and Ryan (2011a) and two promising regulatory policy settings are considered; namely,
(a) a carbon cap and trade system, or (b) a tax on the amount of carbon emissions. A traditional CLSC
network design model using stochastic programming is extended to integrate robust optimization to ac-
count for regulations of the carbon emissions caused by transportation. We propose a hybrid model to
account for both regulatory policies and derive tractable robust counterparts under box and ellipsoidal
uncertainty sets. Implications for network configuration, product allocation and transportation configu-
ration are obtained via a detailed case study. We find that the optimal network configuration balances
the trade-offs between investment, transportation and carbon emission costs if the carbon regulation is
incorporated. More facilities will be opened and the total expected cost will increase as the uncertain-
ty level increases. Moreover, the share of transportation by the low-emitting modes will increase as
the regulation policy uncertainty level increases. We also present computational results that illustrate
how the problem formulation under an ellipsoidal uncertainty set allows the decision maker to balance
the trade-off between robustness and performance. The proposed method yields solutions that provide
protection against the worst case scenario without being too conservative.
The fourth chapter, titled “Robust Design of a Closed-loop Supply Chain Network for Uncertain
Carbon Regulations and Random Product Flows”, focuses on an integrated profit maximization mod-
eling framework for CLSC network design problem and product return management. This integration
can benefit a manufacturer who has control over the return process; for example, by owning the retail
stores. In addition, our model includes the uncertain cost of carbon emissions, which may result from
potential environmental regulations. We build a robust optimization model to address the carbon cost
uncertainty, and develop a piecewise linear approximation for the nonlinear profit as a function of the
refund. The results of the robust model are compared with those of deterministic models where no
5carbon cost is considered or only nominal carbon cost is considered. Extensive parametric analyses
illustrate the impact of the cost, revenue and consumer profile parameters on the optimal refund, profit
and network topology. We find that different parameters vary in their impact on the refund provided, the
profit and the network topology. For policy implications, we found that uncertainty in carbon regulation
has the effect of reducing the optimal refund and thus, results in less returns. This might not benefit the
environment as the products might go to landfill instead of being recycled or reused.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we conclude the thesis with a summary of the results and suggest some future
research directions.
6CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL PRICING AND RETURN POLICIES FOR
REFURBISHED PRODUCTS CONSIDERING TACTICAL CONSUMERS
2.1 Introduction
Refurbished cell phones, laptops and other categories of refurbished electronics are increasingly
common. Such products are offered for sale at a reduced price and explicitly labeled as reprocessed
(e.g., refurbished, returned, remanufactured, or reconditioned). The refurbished products originate from
various sources such as consumer returns, damage during manufacture/shipping, trade-ins or end of life
take-backs (Guide et al., 2006). After they are shipped to the manufacturer, they are inspected and/or
refurbished or remanufactured, then repackaged for sale at a discounted price.
Products labeled as refurbished may be completely new items that were returned to the seller sim-
ply because the original purchaser changed his/her mind. Alternatively, they may have had technical
problems that were repaired by the manufacturer, followed by full testing. The consumer is unlikely to
know the source of refurbished products. A recent study by Ovchinnikov (2011) found that not know-
ing the product history caused great uncertainty in consumer attitudes towards purchasing refurbished
products. One important mechanism to mitigate such uncertainty is the return policy. Marketing and
economics research have confirmed that a return policy reduces consumer risk and provides a better
match between the consumer’s needs and product quality (Mann and Wissink, 1988, 1990; Heiman
et al., 2001). Generally speaking, consumers place a higher value on their ability to return the items
when they face uncertainty (Anderson et al., 2009). From the consumer’s point of view, the question is
whether the initial cost advantage from purchasing a refurbished product outweighs the perceived in-
creased chance of unsatisfactory performance. Even when they can rely on the return policy to mitigate
such unpredictability, they still have to balance the trade-offs between the benefits from the refurbished
product and the loss from the potential return.
7In practice, manufacturers offer various pricing and return policies for refurbished products. For
example, if consumers are unsatisfied for any reason with a refurbished product purchased from HP,
they may return it with no questions asked for a restocking fee of 25% of the purchase price paid1. Dell,
Best Buy and Sony also have similar return policies for the refurbished products with restocking fees
of 10% - 25% of the purchase price. Their refurbished products are usually priced at 75%-85% of the
comparable new product price. However, manufacturers like Epson and Fujitsu price the refurbished
product at 60% to 70% of the comparable new product price but do not allow any returns of refurbished
products2. These observations raise the question of what factors drive the pricing and return policy
decisions concerning the refurbished products. These decisions will affect profits gained from both
refurbished and new products. A low price and/or overly generous return policy could attract more
purchases of refurbished products at the expense of new product sales. On the other hand, a combination
of high price and strict return policy could result in lost revenue from budget-minded and risk-averse
customers.
The goal of this paper is to provide the seller with insights into how the price and return policies
for refurbished products should be designed to maximize profit. To do so, we must understand what
attitudes, general opinions and experiences consumers may have concerning purchasing refurbished
products; and what important factors influence their decisions whether or not to purchase them.
To understand consumer’s attitudes, we conducted an empirical qualitative study using the netnog-
raphy method introduced by Kozinets (2002). Netnography uses the online community to study con-
sumers’ attitudes, perceptions and feelings based on the observation of textual discourse. It is able to
offer “thick descriptions” of real life consumers, and has been adapted to study consumers’ experiences
in the cosmetic (Langer and Beckman, 2005), music (Giesler and Pohlmann, 2003) and tourism (Hsu
et al., 2009) industries. Our empirical study confirms the observation of Ovchinnikov (2011) and finds
that the majority of consumers feel it is somehow “risky” to purchase refurbished products. We also
find heterogeneity in consumer attitudes towards refurbished products. There exist consumers who will
never consider purchasing refurbished products and consumers who will only consider the refurbished
versions. They constantly compare the savings from buying refurbished rather than the comparable
1http://www.hp.com/sbso/buspurchase_refurbished_faq.html#return
2http://www.shopfujitsu.com/www/content/products/notebooks/ordering.php
8new products. But they also seek some mitigation of the potential uncertainty, such as a warranty/return
policy or positive reputation of the purchasing channel and seller. For example, consumers feel more
comfortable knowing that they can return or exchange the refurbished product and perceive less risk
from purchasing a refurbished product that has been certified by the manufacturer.
Based on the empirical findings, a single period analytical framework is built up to model three
types of consumers: those who would purchase only new products, those who would purchase only
refurbished products and those (labeled tactical) who consider both types of products. The tactical
consumer is subject to valuation uncertainty, characterized by a discrete random variable, regarding the
refurbished product. We characterize the consumer demand for the refurbished products as a function of
price and return policy. We present three return policy design strategies for the seller: strict, lenient, and
intermediate. We then develop a detailed profit maximization model for each to explore how the market
segmentation conditions, consumer valuation, and attributes of both new and refurbished products affect
the seller’s optimal pricing and return policy.
Our analytical and numerical studies reveal that different parameters vary in their impacts on the
seller’s optimal price for refurbished products and return policy decisions. Production or refurbishing
cost-related factors and consumer expected valuation have more impact on the pricing decision, while
allowing or not allowing return depends more on the salvage value of returned products and the market
segmentation conditions. Furthermore, the combinations of either low price with relatively strict return
policy or high price with lenient return policy appear to be preferable under a wide variety of conditions.
The contributions of our paper are as follows. We combine qualitative and quantitative research
methods to verify some existing assumptions concerning refurbished products, and we also bring a
marketing perspective to the problem of pricing refurbished products through a focus on factors related
to the demand faced by the seller. We combine three aspects of refurbished product marketing that
are typically examined separately: product return, consumer purchase/return behavior, and market seg-
mentation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that simultaneously addresses all three
aspects in the refurbished product context. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
related research is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 provides the empirical study and Section 4 intro-
duces the basic model notation and assumptions. In Section 5 we analyze the model and present three
different strategies, including results on the optimal price and restocking fee. Numerical analysis and
9the main results are shown in Section 6. We conclude with a discussion of our results and managerial
insights in Section 7.
2.2 Literature Review
Our work is related to a stream of papers that address consumers’ valuation uncertainty by instituting
return policies. Davis et al. (1995) find that the profitability of a money back guarantee is influenced
by the salvage value of the item. Davis et al. (1998) show that the seller should implement a low-hassle
return policy when the product cannot be consumed in a short period of time, the seller can cross-
sell the product, or the returned product has a high salvage value. Wood (2001) finds that a lenient
return policy will increase purchase rates and product return rates for customers in remote purchase
environments. Anderson et al. (2009) illustrate how varying the cost of returning an item affects a
firm’s profits, so that an optimal return policy requires the company to balance both demand and cost
involved in the return policy. Petersen and Kumar (2009) offer a summary of prior research focused
on customer product return behavior from different perspectives. They show that a customer’s product
return behavior positively affects his or her future buying behavior; thus, designing the return policy
should be an important aspect of product management. Within the operations management field, Liu
and Xiao (2008) compare the use of a return policy with inventory rationing in the context of revenue
management and derive conditions on how the firm should choose different policies. Shulman et al.
(2009) study how to use price, restocking fees and information optimally to improve the operational
efficiency. Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk (2009) study the optimal price, return policy and quantity decisions
for new products. In their model, they allow returned products to be recovered and to be sold as good-as-
new ones and they find that an intermediate return policy is preferred under various conditions. Akc¸ay
and Boyacı (2011) investigate the price, ordering quantity and refund decisions for the new product.
They show that selling with “money-back-guaranteed” increases retail sales and profit. Our work differs
from theirs by considering the seller’s pricing and restocking fee decisions in the refurbished product
context.
This paper is also related to the variety decisions (including quantity and pricing) of serving con-
sumers with various quality levels of products. Such issues are addressed by classical literature such
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as Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Moorthy and Png (1992). They study the optimal pricing of products
that are differentiated by quality when consumer valuation of quality is heterogeneous. In a refurbish-
ing context with no return policy involved, Debo et al. (2005) study the joint pricing and production
technology selection problem and derive the manufacturer’s optimal remanufacturing decisions as well
as conditions on the viability of remanufacturing. Vorasayan and Ryan (2006) study the pricing and
quantity issues involved in selling new and refurbished products. They characterize different situations
to refurbish none, some, or all of the returned products by using a queueing network. Jin et al. (2007)
investigate the profitability of selling remanufactured products by using a nonlinear utility function and
find that customer segmentation drives the remanufacturing decision. Atasu et al. (2008) show that
the profitability of a remanufacturing system strongly depends on factors including the remanufactur-
ing cost savings, the green segment size, market growth rate, and consumer valuations. Ghosh et al.
(2010) optimize the production rate for new products and the price for refurbished products in queueing
network model under heavy traffic. Most of this work assumes that consumers have a deterministic
discounted valuation for refurbished products. Our work complements this line of research by incorpo-
rating valuation uncertainty towards refurbished products and the use of a return policy to mitigate it.
We also consider the three different market segments faced by the seller.
The combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods adds to the emerging area of re-
search on consumer behavior in the context of remanufacturing. This stream of study focuses on how
the consumer behavior affects the pricing and remanufacturing strategy. Agrawal et al. (2009) inves-
tigate the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products. They find that
the perceived value of new products will decrease if the OEM sells refurbished products and increase
if a third-party remanufacturer sells them. Guide Jr and Li (2010) use an auction to study consumer’s
willingness-to-pay for both new and remanufactured products. Ovchinnikov (2011) use a survey to
study the switching behavior from new to remanufactured products and finds that the fraction of cus-
tomers who switch has an inverted U-shape with respect to the decrease in the price of remanufactured
product.
11
2.3 Empirical Study
According to Kozinets (2002), netnography is “a new qualitative research methodology that adapts
ethnographic research techniques to study cultures and communities that are emerging through computer-
mediated communications.” We conducted a netnographic study to understand consumer’s attitudes,
opinions and experiences regarding purchasing refurbished electronics. The specific research questions
were: What attitudes, experiences, and feelings do consumers express concerning refurbished electron-
ics? What are the important factors that drive a consumer’s decision to purchase refurbished electronics
or not? We chose the forum of CNET.com, the leading website for consumer technology products, to
collect posts related to refurbished electronics in general, as well as MacRumors.com, a leading con-
sumer forum on Apple products, to study purchasing attitudes within a specific brand. We obtained a
total of 140 posts from both forums by limiting a search of the years 2005 to 2011 (first quarter) to posts
that contained “refurbished” in their titles. The complete threads were directly copied, then coded and
categorized based on consumer attitude and purchase experience before further analysis and interpreta-
tion (by the author). The body of each post was analyzed multiple times to identify consumer attitudes
towards purchasing refurbished products. Below we summarize findings and provide sample quotes to
support them, and provide links to the quotes in Appendix A1.
Most consumers perceive uncertainty about purchasing refurbished products. Most entries began
with a question like “Is it safe to buy a refurbished product?” or “Should I buy refurbished?” The
respondents posted their opinions and experiences. One typical response is: “It is a 50/50, toss of the
coin issue when it comes to buying refurbished anything. Sometimes you make out OK, sometimes you
don’t.”
One reason for such uncertainty is that refurbished products come from various sources. One con-
tributor mentioned:“‘Refurbished’ is a crap shoot. Refurbished products come from a variety of sources.
There may have been nothing at all wrong with it. It may have an intermittent problem that does not
immediately make its presence known. It may have an overheating problem and work fine for a few
minutes, then completely quit working and is returned for that reason... After saying all this, in my
experience, the odds are with you in the long run. Not every device that you buy ‘refurbished’ will be a
defective device. You’re going to get several good ones for every bad one you get, but expect a bad one
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every now and then.”
Some consumers value a refurbished product very closely to the new counterpart. One typical
response is: “Apple brings the products back to as-new specifications. They even replace the outer
cases on products like the iPods, so you don’t even have to worry about getting one with cosmetic
damage.”
Overall, we identified mixed attitudes towards purchasing refurbished electronics. Certain con-
sumers will never again purchase them because of a previous negative experience. For example, “Re-
furbished computers – I wouldn’t do it again.” Others will never even consider purchasing a refurbished
product. “I have always stayed away from refurbished products they weren’t as good.” But there are
also consumers who, out of satisfaction with previous purchases, have decided to only purchase re-
furbished products. For example, one contributor wrote, “I almost always buy refurbished rather than
brand new.” One reason is that they believe the refurbished product has been thoroughly tested whereas
only a small sample of the new products have been tested. “High-volume production lines typically
omit 100% testing of all production items, opting instead to bear the cost of a small percentage being
returned to make them serviceable. Thus, such ‘refurbished’ items are more thoroughly tested than a
new off-the-shelf unit at a dealer, boding well for buying such a unit... I’m a proponent of refurbished
electronics and have great success with them while saving money!”
Noticeably, consumers tend to compare a new product with a refurbished one within a specific mod-
el. A common question posed is “should I buy a new or refurbished one?” For example, a common
post is like: “The camcorder (Canon Vixia HF200) is $749 new but the refurbished one is $399! Is the
price worth the camcorder being refurbished?” Several factors, of which cost saving is the most com-
mon, influence the consumer’s purchasing decision. For example, one contributor suggests that “You
should be able to save 30% - 50% on a refurbished electronics purchase.” Moreover, the refurbished
product should be covered a warranty or return policy. One typical response is: “The key is making sure
you’re comfortable with where you’re getting the item from and making sure they have some kind of
warranty (whether it’s exchange or return).” Furthermore, the refurbished product should be certified
and produced by the manufacturer. Typical words are: “I would not hesitate to buy a factory refurbished
product, especially if I’m buying it from the manufacturer.”
Entries from MacRumors.com also show that uncertainty-mitigation mechanisms are very impor-
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tant. For example, one contributor asked: “I think I’m going to buy a refurbished Macbook (Aluminium
or Pro), but what is the return policy? If I get it, and I’m not happy can I return it? What if it has a
scratch or dead pixels? Can I return it for a replacement?” As the MacRumors contributors usually
purchase the refurbished products directly from Apple’s online store, their concerns are more specific
about the hassle of a possible return or exchange. For example, if they purchase the refurbished prod-
ucts online, can they return it to the local store? Finally, return of a refurbished product might not be
due to functional defect, but because they feel the quality is not worth the price. One typical response
is: “I recently bought a refurbished 24” ACD and it had a big piece of dust between the glass and the
screen. It was very noticeable to me, so I returned it immediately for a full refund. I tried for a second
refurbished 24” ACD and it had a smaller piece of dust, but it also had a dead pixel (stuck on red), so I
returned it as well. I just couldn’t justify paying $599 for a display that wasn’t perfect.”
To summarize these qualitative findings, it is clear that consumers have heterogeneous attitudes to-
wards refurbished electronics and many feel it is more risky to purchase refurbished than new. Their ex
post valuation could turn out to be “as good as new” or “someone else’s headache”. This is consistent
with the observation of Ovchinnikov (2011) that such uncertainly stems from not knowing the histo-
ry of refurbished products. When they decide to purchase the refurbished product, they want enough
cost savings to compensate for such uncertainty. At the same time, they seek risk-mitigation mecha-
nisms. They rely on the purchasing channel, the seller’s reputation and the warranty/return policy to
counterbalance the unpredictability of refurbished product quality.
2.4 Model Assumptions and Notation
The following assumptions are made throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. Consumers are interested in a specific brand and model of product.
As indicated by the empirical study, we focus on the situation where the consumers have a specific
brand and model in mind but have not decided whether to buy a new or refurbished one. The total
number of consumers in the market is normalized to 1. Each consumer is interested in purchasing at
most one unit of the product.
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Assumption 2. There are three segments of potential customers: (1) New product consumers (denoted
as N-consumers) who will never consider purchasing a refurbished product; (2) Refurbished product
consumers (denoted as R-consumers) who would only purchase a refurbished product; and (3) “Tacti-
cal” consumers (denoted as T-consumers) who will consider purchasing either a new or a refurbished
product. The proportions of consumers who fall into these categories are βN , βR and βT , respectively
(βN +βR +βT = 1). Within each market segment, consumer valuations of the new product are uniformly
distributed on [0, 1].
Our empirical findings from the netnographic study indicate the existence of these market segments,
assuming the stated preferences of consumers match their real market behaviors. The existence of N-
consumers is also mentioned in Agrawal et al. (2008) while R-consumers are mentioned in Atasu et al.
(2008) where they were labeled “green consumers.” Note that we can model any degree of customer
segmentation by this setting. If βT = 1, all consumers in the market consider purchasing either a new
or a refurbished product. On the other hand, if βT = 0, the market is perfectly segmented into N-
consumers and R-consumers. Thus, the proportion of consumers who are tactical reflects the potential
for cannibalization of demand between the new and the refurbished product. The firm could identify
the proportion of consumers of each type by marketing research.
Assumption 3. The decision variables are the price, pr, of the refurbished products and the restocking
fee, denoted by f , where 0 ≤ f ≤ pr. The hassle cost for the consumers to return the refurbished
product is normalized to zero. The return policy is characterized by f .
The returns of refurbished products are due to heterogeneous consumer expectations before and
after the purchase. We assume the R-consumers have more knowledge about the functionality of the
refurbished products, and do not experience any “gaps” between their expectations and the actual val-
uation of the refurbished products. Thus, all the R-consumers will keep the refurbished products they
purchased. A T-consumer will perceive lower than expected value from the refurbished product (called
a “lemon”) with probability δ and will receive “completely as new” (designated as a “peach” product)
with probability 1 − δ.
Assumption 4. The price of a new product pn is exogenously given, and pn ≥ δφ, where φ represents
the lemon’s degradation in value (0 < φ < 1) by T-consumers. We do not consider returns of the new
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product and assume the monopolist seller has an ample supply of the refurbished products.
The exogenous price assumption is based on the observation that refurbished products appear later
than the corresponding new products so that their pricing can be delayed. Also, there is a noticeable time
lag between when product returns increase to stable volumes and when refurbished products become
available (see Figure 2 in Guide et al. (2006)). The inequality in Assumption 4 states that the expected
degradation in valuation (δφ) is less than the new product price. This is reasonable given that the values
of δ and φ are expected to be small and pn should be high.
In practice, the seller needs to build an inventory of refurbished products from the return of new
products. This, however, is beyond the scope of our single period model. We assume that the supply of
the refurbished product is not an issue for the seller, either due to a high volume of returned products or
by labeling a certain amount of new products as refurbished when facing a limited supply of refurbished
products (Jin et al., 2007).
Assumption 5. When a refurbished product is returned, the seller obtains a net salvage value v ≤ cr <
cn, where cr (resp. cn) is the marginal cost of producing a refurbished (resp. new) product.
Assumption 5 is consistent with previous research; for example, Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk (2009).
Note that we consider only the marginal production costs for new product and refurbished product,
which is consistent with the closed-loop supply chain literature (Savaskan et al., 2004; Atasu et al.,
2008). The notation is summarized in Table 2.1.
2.5 Analysis
The seller decides on the price of the refurbished product and the associated return policy. Then,
each consumer observes the seller’s decision and decides which product to purchase based on maximiz-
ing his/her own surplus. Therefore, our model is a Stackelberg game in which the seller is the leader
and the consumers are the followers. The sequence of events is (see Figure 2.1):
(i). The seller sets the price and restocking fee for the refurbished product.
(ii). Based on their utility functions, the N-consumers decide whether to buy a new product or not
to buy, the R-consumers decide to buy a refurbished product or not to buy, and the T-consumers decide
whether to buy a new or a refurbished product or neither.
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Table 2.1 Model notation
Symbol Definition
DecisionVariables
pr Sale price for the refurbished product
f Restocking fee for the returned refurbished product
Parameters
βN Proportion of N-consumers in the market
βR Proportion of R-consumers in the market
βT Proportion of T-consumers in the market
δ Proportion of “lemon” refurbished products
φ Degradation in valuation for the “lemon” refurbished product
pn Sale price for the new product
cn Marginal cost of producing the new product
cr Marginal cost of processing the refurbished product
v Net salvage value of a returned refurbished product
(iii). A T-consumer who purchased the refurbished product decides whether to keep the product or
return it for a refund of pr less the fee f .
Do not buy
npθ −
 Buy refurbished product
 Buy new product
Peach 
r
pθ −
Lemon 
Decision 
Node
Chance  
Node
Do not buy
0
Buy new product
- npθ
Keep
f−
Return
(1 ) rpφ θ− −
Seller chooses 
rp fand
N- consumers
R- consumers
T- consumers
0
( )r nf p p≤ ≤ Do not buy 0
Buy refurbished product
rpθ −
(1 )δ−
( )δ
Figure 2.1 Sequence of events
An N-consumer may either demand superior performance of the product or have had a bad experi-
ence with a refurbished product. He or she obtains utility θ− pn from the new product and 0 utility from
the refurbished product and, thus, will purchase the new product only when his/her utility exceeds its
price; that is, θ > pn. The proportion of the N-consumers who will purchase the new product is 1 − pn.
Because pn is given exogenously, for a given βN , the seller gains a net revenue of βN(1 − pn)(pn − cn)
from the sales to N-consumers. For simplicity, we omit this portion of profit from the seller’s objective
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function, as it is not influenced by the decision variables.
The R-consumer may care more about the functionality of the product or be more environmentally
conscious and, therefore, value the refurbished product at least as highly as the new product. Hence,
an R-consumer receives utility θ − pn from a new product and at least θ − pr from the refurbished
one. Assuming pr < pn, the R-consumer will always prefer to buy a refurbished product and will
purchase one if his/her utility exceeds that price; that is, θ > pr. The proportion of the R-consumers
who will purchase the refurbished product is 1 − pr. Because the purchase behavior of the N- and
R-consumers will not be affected by the seller’s return policy, we focus our analysis on the behavior of
the T-consumers.
The T-consumer makes two sequential decisions: (1) whether to buy either the new product or the
refurbished product, and (2) conditioned on buying the refurbished product, whether to return it or keep
it. The T-consumer will keep the peach products and consider returning the lemon products. They will
return the lemon if (1 − φ)θ − pr ≤ − f , and keep it otherwise. Therefore, the expected utility before
purchasing the refurbished product is given by UTr ≡ (1 − δ)(θ − pr) + δmax
[
(1 − φ)θ − pr,− f ].
Backward induction reveals that they prefer the refurbished product if their ex ante expected utility
is greater than the utility they derive from purchasing a new product; i.e., UTr ≥ θ − pn. Define θh to be
the valuation level for which the T-consumer is indifferent between purchasing the new and refurbished
products, and θl as the level for which the consumer is indifferent between purchasing the refurbished
product and not purchasing at all. We assume that these values are endogenously determined by the
seller’s price and return policy; thus, θh and θl are functions of pr and f . The proportions of the T-
consumers who purchase the new and refurbished products, respectively, are given by 1− θh and θh− θl.
To characterize the effect of restocking fees, we first define the consumer with valuation equal to θ¯
as indifferent between keeping the lemon refurbished product and returning it; that is, θ¯ ≡ pr − f
1 − φ . Thus,
consumers with valuation less than θ¯ will return the lemon refurbished products, which consumers with
valuation greater than θ¯ will keep them.
We can then calculate the seller’s profit as a function of pr and f . Since a consumer’s valuation is a
private information, the seller must set the price and restocking fee for the refurbished product and then
allow each consumer to choose the product he/she favors by comparing the surplus gained from each.
Based on the comparison of θ¯, θh and θl, we can describe the seller’s approach as offering either a strict,
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a lenient, or an intermediate return policy.
2.5.1 Strict Return Policy
Under this strategy, the seller discourages the T-consumer from returning any lemon refurbished
products. For a T-consumer, the expected surplus from purchasing the refurbished product is UˆTr (θ) ≡
(1−δ)(θ− pr)+δ((1−φ)θ− pr). According to the definitions of θh and θl, their values under this strategy
must satisfy θˆh − pn = UˆTr (θˆh) and UˆTr (θˆl) = 0. Thus,
θˆh =
pn − pr
δφ
, (2.1)
θˆl =
pr
1 − δφ. (2.2)
Therefore, if the seller sets the price and restocking fees so that θ¯ ≤ θˆl ≤ θˆh, no returns of refurbished
products will occur because all of the consumers will prefer to keep the lemon product. The comparison
of θ¯, θˆh and θˆl is shown in Figure 2.2.
θ
l
θ
∧
h
θ
∧
10
Prefer refurbished product Prefer new product
Keeping lemon refurbished product is more attractive
Figure 2.2 Comparison between θ¯, θˆh and θˆl under the strict return policy
Under the strict return policy, the seller solves the following problem:
max
pr
Πˆ =
(
βR(1 − pr) + βT
(
pn − pr
δφ
− pr
1 − δφ
))
(pr − cr) + βT
(
1 − pn − pr
δφ
)
(pn − cn)
(2.3)
s.t. pr ≤ (1 − δφ)pn (2.4)
(1 − δφ) f − (1 − δ)φpr ≥ 0 (2.5)
pr ≥ pn − δφ (2.6)
The objective is to maximize the profit from selling both products. The first term in the objective
function is the profit from selling refurbished products to the R-consumers and the T-consumers. The
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second term is the profit from selling new products to the T-consumers. Constraint (2.4) ensures θˆl ≤ θˆh
and constraint (2.5) ensures θ¯ ≤ θˆl. Constraint (2.6) guarantees that the T-consumers have nonnegative
demand for new products; that is, θˆh ≤ 1. Assumption 4 and constraint (2.6) imply that pr ≥ 0, while
f ≥ 0 is implied by constraint (2.5). Moreover, pr ≤ pn is implied by constraint (2.4).
It is straightforward to verify concavity of Πˆ(pr) by its second derivative, and we then form the
Lagrangian using multipliers λˆ1, λˆ2, λˆ3 and λˆ4:
Lˆ(pr, f ) = Πˆ + λˆ1((1 − δφ)pn − pr) + λˆ2((1 − δφ) f − (1 − δ)φpr)
+λˆ3(pr − pn + δφ) + λˆ4(pr − f )
A
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Figure 2.3 (a)Possible options for the seller when pn ≥ 1 − (1 − δ)φ; (b) Possible options for the seller
when pn ≤ 1 − (1 − δ)φ;
By setting different combinations of λˆ1 and λˆ3 equal to 0, the KKT conditions generate systems of
equations that can be solved to identify options A, B and C for the seller under this strategy (see Figure
2.3). On the line containing segment AC, θˆl = θ¯, so no one will return the lemon refurbished products.
We ignore the region above this line because there is no need to set the restocking fee any higher. At
point C, θˆh = 1, so T-consumers buy only refurbished products. At point A, θˆh = θˆl = θ¯, so T-consumers
buy only new products. The line containing segment AC has slope 0 <
(1 − δ)φ
1 − δφ < 1. The values of the
decision variables at points A, B and C along with conditions under which each is optimal under the
strict return policy are given in Appendix A2.
Theorem 1. Under the strict return policy, (i) If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, (1 − δφ)cn], the point A
cannot be optimal.
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(ii) If cr > max
[
(1 − δφ)cn − 2δφ(1 − pn), 2(pn − δφ) − 1], the point C cannot be optimal.
All proofs are provided in Appendix A5. Theorem 1(i) indicates that when the cost of refurbishing
is low relative to either the price or the cost of new products, the seller should price the refurbished
products low enough to attract some demand from the T-consumers. Theorem 1(ii) states that when
the refurbishing cost is high, the seller should price the refurbished products high enough that some
T-consumers prefer the new products.
2.5.2 Lenient Return Policy
Under this strategy, the seller sets the price and restocking fees such that every T-consumer who
receives a lemon product will return it. The expected surplus from buying and returning the refurbished
product is U˘Tr (θ) ≡ (1− δ)(θ− pr) + δ(− f ). According to the definitions of θh and θl, under this strategy
their values are:
θ˘h =
(
pn − (1 − δ)pr
δ
− f
)
, (2.7)
θ˘l =
(
δ f
1 − δ + pr
)
. (2.8)
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Figure 2.4 Comparison between θ¯, θ˘h and θ˘l under the lenient return policy
Thus, if the seller sets the price and restocking fees so that θ˘l ≤ θ˘h ≤ θ¯, all of the lemon refurbished
products will be returned (see Figure 2.4).
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Under this strategy, the seller solves the following problem:
max
pr , f
Π˘ = δβT
(
pn − (1 − δ)pr
δ
− f − δ f
(1 − δ) − pr
)
( f + v − cr)
+βT (1 − pn − (1 − δ)pr
δ
+ f )(pn − cn)
+
(
(1 − δ)βT
(
pn − (1 − δ)pr
δ
− f − δ f
(1 − δ) − pr
)
+ βR(1 − pr)
)
(pr − cr) (2.9)
s.t. (1 − (1 − δ)φ)pr − δφ f ≥ (1 − φ)pn (2.10)
δ f + (1 − δ)pr ≤ (1 − δ)pn (2.11)
δ f + (1 − δ)pr ≥ pn − δ (2.12)
f ≥ 0 (2.13)
The first term of the objective function is the profit or loss due to consumer returns, while the second
term is the profit from selling the new products to the T-consumers, and the last term is the profit from
selling refurbished products to the T-consumers and R-consumers. Constraint (2.10) ensures θ¯ ≥ θ˘h.
Constraint (2.11) guarantees that θ˘h ≥ θ˘l. Constraint (2.12) provides for a nonnegative demand for the
new products from the T-consumers; i.e., θ˘h ≤ 1. We do not need to include constraint f ≤ pr because
this condition is always implied by constraint (2.10) and pr ≤ pn. We also can omit constraint pr ≤ pn
because this condition is implied by constraints (2.11) and (2.13). Moreover, pr ≥ 0 is implied by
constraints (2.10) and (2.13).
We then form the Lagrangian with multipliers λ˘1, λ˘2, λ˘3 and λ˘4.
L˘(pr, f ) = Πˆ + λ˘1(1 − (1 − δ)φpr − δφ f − (1 − φ)pn) + λ˘2((1 − δ)pn − δ f − (1 − δ)pr)
+λ˘3(δ f + (1 − δ)pr − pn + δ) + λ˘4 f
By setting different combinations of λ˘1, λ˘2, λ˘3 and λ˘4 to zero, these conditions lead to all possible
options A and D through K for the seller under the lenient return policy when pn ≥ 1 − (1 − δ)φ (see
Figure 2.3(a)). When pn ≤ 1 − (1 − δ)φ, the possible options for the seller are A,D,D′, F,G, J,K (see
Figure 2.3(b)). On the line containing segment AE, θ˘h = θ¯. θ˘h = θ˘l on the line containing segment AK,
and there is no demand for refurbished products. The line containing EI in Figure 2.3(a) is where θ˘h = 1
and there is no demand for new products. We should also note that at point A, θ˘h = θ˘l = θ¯. The lines
containing segments AK and EI have the same slope equal to − (1 − δ)
δ
. The line containing segment
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AE has a positive slope of
1 − (1 − δ)φ
δφ
. The value of pr at point E, which is pn − δφ, is a lower bound
for pr. Each option’s value of the decision variables and conditions under which points A and D ( D′)
through K are optimal under the lenient return policy are given in Appendix A3.
Theorem 2. Under the lenient return policy,
(i). If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, δv + (1 − δ)cn], then points A and G are not optimal.
(ii). If cr > max
[
vδ + (1 − δ)cn, 1 − 2(1 − pn)1 − δ
]
, then points H and I are not optimal.
(iii). If cr > 2pn − 1, then points E and F are not optimal. If pn < 1 − (1 − δ)φ, then point E cannot
be optimal.
(iv). If cn < 2pn − 1, then points J and K are not optimal.
Theorem 2(i) shows that when the refurbishing cost is low, serving the T-consumers with only the
new product is not optimal for the seller under strategy 2. Moreover, Theorem 2(ii) and (iii) show that
when the refurbishing cost is high, serving the T-consumers with only the refurbished products is not
favorable. Theorem 2(iii) also indicates that when the price of the new product is low, serving the T-
consumers with only refurbished products is not optimal. Theorem 2(iv) also indicates that when the
cost of the new product is low, encouraging returns by charging the consumer no restocking fees for the
refurbished product is not optimal. Note that point A is common to both the strict and the lenient return
policies, as it results in selling only new products to T-consumers.
2.5.3 Intermediate Return Policy
Under the third strategy, the seller sets the price and restocking fees so that θ˘l ≤ θ¯ ≤ θˆh (see Figure
2.5). Therefore, some T-consumers who purchase the refurbished products and receive “lemons” will
return them while others will not.
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Figure 2.5 Comparison between θ¯, θˆh and θ˘l under the intermediate return policy
Under this intermediate strategy, the seller solves the following problem:
max
pr , f
Π˜ = βT
(
1 − pn − pr
δφ
)
(pn − cn) + δβT
(
pr − f
1 − φ −
δ f
(1 − δ) − pr
)
( f + v − cr)
+
(
βT
(
pn − pr
δφ
− δ
(
pr − f
1 − φ
)
− (1 − δ)
(
δ f
(1 − δ) + pr
))
+ βR(1 − pr)
)
(pr − cr) (2.14)
s.t. (1 − δ)φpr − (1 − δφ) f ≥ 0 (2.15)
(1 − (1 − δ)φ)pr − δφ f ≤ (1 − φ)pn (2.16)
pr ≥ pn − δφ (2.17)
f ≥ 0 (2.18)
The objective function terms represent the same profit components as in the previous models. Con-
straint (2.15) ensures that θ¯ ≥ θ˘l , and constraint (2.16) enforces that θˆh ≥ θ¯. Constraint (2.17) guarantees
that there are nonnegative demands for the new products from the T-consumers. We can omit the con-
straint f ≤ pr because it is implied by constraint (2.15). We need not include constraint pr ≤ pn as this
condition is implied by constraint (2.16).
Again, the Hessian matrix for the profit function is positive definite. Therefore, the function Π˜(pr, f )
is concave. We then form the Lagrangian using multipliers λ˜1, λ˜2, λ˜3 and λ˜4.
L˜(pr, f ) = Π˜ + λ˜1((1 − δ)φpr − (1 − δφ) f ) + λ˜2((1 − φ)pn − (1 − (1 − δ)φ)pr + δφ f )
+λ˜3(pr − pn + δφ)
By setting different combinations of λ˜1, λ˜2, λ˜3 and λ˜4 to zero, these conditions lead to all possible
options L, M and A through E for the seller under the intermediate return policy when pn+(1−δ)φ−1 ≥ 0
(see Figure 2.3(a)). When pn+(1−δ)φ−1 ≤ 0, the possible options for the seller are A, B,C,D,D′, E′,M′
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(see Figure 2.3(b)). Note the points in common with the other two policies. The intermediate policy
reduces to the strict policy on line containing segment AC. Similarly, it shares a boundary with the
lenient policy along AE (AD′). The line containing segment CL represents θˆh = 1, so T-consumers buy
only refurbished products. Each option’s value of the decision variables and conditions under which
option L, M, A through E (D′, E′,M′ as well) are optimal under the intermediate policy are given in
Appendix A4.
Theorem 3. Under the intermediate return policy,
(i). If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, δv + (1 − δ)cn, (1 − δφ)cn], then point A is not optimal.
(ii). If cr > max
[
(1 − δφ)cn − 2δφ, 2(pn − δφ) − 1], then points C and L are not optimal.
(iii). If
v
cr
>
1 − φ
1 − δφ , then points B and C are not optimal.
(iv). If (1 − φ)cr − (1 − δφ)v > 2(1 − φ)(1 − pn), then point E is not optimal.
(v). If vδφ + (1 − φ)cr < (1 − φ)cn, then point D is not optimal.
Theorem 3(i) shows that serving the T-consumers with only new products will not be favorable
when the cost of refurbishing is low. Theorem 3(iii) also indicates that if the ratio of salvage value to
the cost of refurbishing exceeds a threshold value, discouraging the return of refurbished product will
not be optimal. Theorem 3(ii) and (iv) show that if the refurbishing cost is high or the salvage value is
too low, serving the T-consumers with only refurbished products while allowing return is not optimal.
Theorem 3(v) illustrates that when both the cost of refurbishing the product and the salvage value are
low, serving the T-consumers with both new and refurbished products and encouraging returns will not
be an optimal choice for the seller.
To summarize, the seller has several options for setting the price and restocking fees of refurbished
products, shown in Figure 2.3. Corollary 1 summarizes the conditions under which the pricing extremes
A, C, L and E cannot be optimal for the seller under any return policy.
Corollary 1. (i). If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, δv + (1 − δ)cn, (1 − δφ)cn], then point A is not optimal.
(ii) If cr > max
[
(1 − δφ)cn − 2δφ(1 − pn), 2pn − 1, 1 − δφ1 − φ + 2(1 − pn)
]
, then points C, L and E are
not optimal.
Corollary 1 indicates that the refurbishing cost plays an important role in deciding with which
products to serve the T-consumers. When the refurbishing cost is low relative to the price of the new
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product, the salvage value and the cost of producing a new product, serving the T-consumers with only
the new product by charging a high pr will not be optimal. On the other hand, when the refurbishing
cost is high, serving the T-consumers with only the refurbished product by pricing them cheaply will
not be favorable.
2.6 Numerical Study
The analytical results provide some guidance concerning conditions under which the different s-
trategies and their options may be optimal, but leave many questions unanswered. In particular, we
wish to provide insight into the types of situations in which the different options are optimal overal-
l. We characterize the seller’s pricing decision in terms of the product variety choice provided to the
T-consumers. The illustrations of all the options are provided in Figure 2.6. Because the expressions
for the decision variables and profit under the different options are too complex to decipher analytical-
ly, we performed an extensive numerical experiment to validate our analytical findings and to better
understand the optimal price, return policy and profit.
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Variety
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'
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Figure 2.6 Characteristics of different options for the seller
The numerical study consists of 32, 000 total instances resulting from a full factorial combination
of the values listed in Table 2.2. The value of βN is fixed at 0.1, and βR = 0.9 − βT . These parameters
cover a wide range of plausible values and could represent all the possible variations in market segment
conditions (in terms of βT and βR), consumer valuation degradation (in terms of φ and δ), product
segment (in terms of pn) and cost factors (in terms of cn, cr and v). We set φ and δ to at most 0.5 to
satisfy Assumption 4. For each parameter combination, we optimized Πˆ, Π˘ and Π˜, chose the largest
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as the optimal profit Π∗, and recorded the corresponding optimal refurbished product price p∗r and
restocking fee f ∗. With the exception of 4 particular instances where there was no feasible solution
under the strict return policy, we obtained an optimal solution under each policy for all instances.
Table 2.2 Parameter value settings in numerical experiments
Parameter Values
βT {0.1, 0.35, 0.6, 0.85}
δ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4,0.5}
φ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4,0.5}
pn {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9}
cn {0.1pn, 0.3pn, 0.5pn, 0.7pn}
cr {0.1cn, 0.3cn, 0.5cn, 0.7cn}
v {0.1cr, 0.35cn, 0.6cr, 0.85cr}
Table 2.3 shows the average values of βR, βT , pn, φ, δ, EV, cn/pn, cr/cn and v/cr for which each
of options B, C, G, J, K, L and M were optimal (the remaining options were not optimal for any
combination of parameters tested). The average values of Π∗, p∗r , f ∗, p∗r/pn, and f ∗/pr are shown in
Table 2.4 as well as the average profit from selling new products to T-consumers (denoted as ΠNT ), profit
from selling refurbished products to the T-consumers (ΠRT ), profit/loss due to the consumer returns
(ΠReturn) and profit from sale of the refurbished products to the R-consumers (ΠRR). Note that the values
of f under options B, C, and K are not really meaningful because no refurbished products are returned
in those cases (either because none are sold to T-consumers, or because of the strict return policy). We
also calculated the frequency with which each option was optimal. In the following sections we first
examine the seller’s product variety decision and return policy decisions separately, and then observe
their interactions.
2.6.1 Product Variety Decision for the T-consumers
Serving T-consumers with only new products (Option K) is optimal when the population of R-
consumers is large, refurbishing cost is high, and the salvage value of returned product is low. From
the seller’s point of view, extreme high refurbishing cost and low salvage value make it less profitable to
serve the T-consumer with refurbished products. Charging a very high price for the refurbished product
results in the T-consumers purchasing only the new product. As the market size of R-consumers is very
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Table 2.3 Average parameter values for which options are optimal
Option βR βT pn φ δ EV cn/pn cr/cn v/cr
B 0.308 0.592 0.625 0.349 0.377 0.870 0.259 0.476 0.365
C 0.420 0.480 0.735 0.250 0.283 0.931 0.429 0.370 0.399
G 0.616 0.284 0.644 0.452 0.438 0.803 0.325 0.528 0.561
J 0.560 0.340 0.533 0.418 0.352 0.855 0.364 0.380 0.532
K 0.654 0.246 0.512 0.341 0.380 0.871 0.408 0.597 0.449
L 0.419 0.481 0.748 0.381 0.234 0.910 0.436 0.360 0.811
M 0.298 0.602 0.633 0.417 0.338 0.860 0.258 0.457 0.814
Table 2.4 Average profit, price and restocking fees
Option Frequency at Optimality Π∗ p∗r f ∗ p∗r/pn f ∗/pr ΠNT ΠRT ΠReturn ΠRR
B 0.111 0.166 0.516 0.131 0.828 0.255 0.046 0.056 0.0000 0.063
C 0.610 0.139 0.666 0.130 0.906 0.197 0.000 0.068 0.0000 0.071
G 0.017 0.165 0.564 0.068 0.877 0.122 0.042 0.003 0.0001 0.119
J 0.039 0.176 0.516 0.000 0.970 0.000 0.055 0.004 -0.0002 0.117
K 0.052 0.160 0.512 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.0000 0.123
L 0.137 0.137 0.658 0.203 0.880 0.309 0.000 0.065 0.0003 0.072
M 0.137 0.166 0.515 0.161 0.816 0.312 0.047 0.056 0.0004 0.063
large, the seller can extract considerable profit from those consumers to compensate for the absence of
refurbished product sales to the T-consumers. As shown in Table 2.4, R-consumers are the major source
of profit under option K; thus, a large population of R-consumers is an important factor in identifying
this option as optimal.
Under options C and L, the seller will serve the T-consumers with only refurbished products. Serv-
ing T-consumers with only refurbished products is optimal when the refurbishing cost is low, new prod-
uct production cost and price are high and the T-consumers’ expected value degradation of refurbished
products is low. Because the T-consumers value the refurbished product highly, they can be charged a
higher price (see Table 2.4). With this high price, the R-consumers also pay more for the refurbished
product. Also, the high cost of the new products erodes the profitability of selling them. Table 2.4 shows
that the profits from T-consumers and R-consumers are nearly the same under options C and L. But the
overall profit is relatively low. Thus, even though the seller charges a high price to both segments, the
lack of new product sales is felt.
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Under options B, G, J and M, the seller will serve the T-consumers with both new and refurbished
products. Serving the T-consumers with both new and refurbished products is valuable under low pro-
duction cost for new products, low to medium refurbishing cost and medium to high value degradation
of the refurbished products. As long as neither the cost of new products or the refurbishing cost is high,
those options can be applied. Low production cost for the new product will ensure the profitability
from selling it, while the price for refurbished products varies among options B, G, J and M, which are
differentiated by return policy as explained below. As the seller is able to differentiate the market to the
maximum degree, options B, G, J and M generate high profits.
2.6.2 Return Policy Decision
Return of the lemon refurbished product occurs under options G, J, L, and M. Those options are
characterized by relatively high salvage value for returned product. Average conditions for options M
and L are very similar to options B and C (under which no returns occur), except the salvage value under
options L and M are higher. Therefore, allowing or not allowing return depends on the salvage value
of returned products. Allowing return will be favored when the salvage value of returned products is
not too low but the strict return policy should be employed when the salvage value of returned product
is very low. This conclusion is consistent with the results from Davis et al. (1998) and Shulman et al.
(2009), where they find the salvage value plays an important role in determining the leniency of the
return policy.
Among the options where T-consumers purchase both products, options G and J represent the most
generous return policy while option M represents the intermediate return policy where only some of
the T-consumers will return the lemon products. Conditions where options G and J are optimal are
characterized by a relatively small proportion of T-consumers and relatively low expected valuation for
refurbished products. Under option G, allowing the T-consumers to return all of the lemon products
will protect them from the low valuation. With 12.2% restocking fees on average, the seller incurs a
slight profit from the return. Under option J, the T-consumer can return the refurbished product for free
at the expense of paying a very high price. Because of the very low refurbishing cost, the seller actually
incurs a slight loss from the returns. Thus, a generous return policy will be favored when the proportion
of T-consumers is small and their expected value degradation of refurbished products is relatively high.
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A small number of T-consumers ensures that the return quantities are not too high while minimal unit
loss ( f + v − cr) or even a slight unit profit results from the returns.
Under options L and M, the seller will charge a restocking fee of nearly 30% on average. This is
very close to the real life observation where some sellers (e.g., HP) set the restocking fees around 25%.
Lowering the price of the refurbished product and increasing the restocking fee (compared to option B
or C) induces some but not all T-consumers to return the lemon refurbished product. Options L and M
are optimal where there is a large segment of T-consumers. Because a large population of T-consumers
makes it unaffordable for the seller to allow all of them to return the lemon products, the intermediate
return policy is appropriate. Thus, an intermediate return policy is preferred when T-consumers form a
large proportion of the market and their value degradation of refurbished products is low to medium.
Table 2.4 shows that the seller actually gains a tiny profit under the intermediate return policy due to the
small amount of returns, the restocking fee charged and high salvage value.
Among these combinations of parameter values, option C was optimal in 61% of the cases, followed
in frequency by options B, L and M, and lastly by options G, J and K. This is because in the numerical
experiment, the size of R-consumer and T-consumer segments both varied from 0.1 to 0.9. In reality,
the proportion of R-consumers is expected to be small. If the values of βT are at least 0.5 or 0.6, we
expect the optimality frequency of options B and M to increase relative to the other options.
2.6.3 Combined Decisions
An examination of the seller’s product variety and return policy decisions together indicates that
serving the T-consumers with only refurbished products and offering a lenient return policy (options E,
H or I) is not a good combination, as large amounts of returns would erode the seller’s profit. The inter-
mediate return policy (including its strict and lenient boundary cases) is appropriate if the seller decides
to serve the T-consumers with both new and refurbished products. Moreover, either the combination
of low price with relatively strict return policy (options B/M) or high price with lenient return policy
(options G/J) appear to be favorable under a wide variety of conditions. A combination of high price
and strict return policy (option K) might be preferred under very special market conditions (e.g., when
the proportion of R-consumers is very large). The combination of low price and strict return policy
reflects the practice of Epson and Fujitsu while a high price with strict return policy falls in line with
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other manufacturers (e.g., HP and Apple).
Observing the two decisions together reveals additional insights. First, the R-consumers are “an-
gels” for the seller while the T-consumers are not. The profit is usually higher when the proportion
of R-consumers in the market is large (e.g., options G, J and K). Because the R-consumers value the
refurbished product at least as highly as the new product and will always keep it, they will be a stable
source of profit. The T-consumers, in contrast, not only have a discounted valuation of the refurbished
product, but they will also return it in some cases. Second, allowing returns may expand the market.
Atasu et al. (2008) find that the seller can charge a high price for the remanufactured product when the
consumer’s valuation is high. But under option G, the seller is able to charge a relatively high price even
when the consumer’s expected valuation is low. Third, losses resulting from allowing the consumers to
return the refurbished products may be offset by charging a high price, as in option J.
2.7 Discussion
When a seller offers both new and refurbished products, he or she should be aware of the heteroge-
neous attitudes the consumer may have towards refurbished products. Our empirical study indicates that
there exist consumers who will never consider purchasing refurbished products and consumers who will
only consider purchasing the refurbished version of a given model. But the majority of consumer will
consider purchasing both products and have uncertainty concerning their valuation of refurbished elec-
tronics. Those tactical consumers want enough cost savings to compensate for the valuation uncertainty
and seek various mechanisms to mitigate such unpredictability.
Motivated by the empirical study, we focused on two strategic decisions of the seller; namely, the
selling price and restocking fee for the refurbished products. We analyzed three different strategies
for the seller and explored the optimal price and restocking fees in a numerical study. Optimality
conditions and numerical analysis show that different combinations of price and restocking fees are
favored under different conditions. The combinations of either low price and strict return policy or high
price and lenient return policy are prevalent. Such results are consistent with observations from real life
3. We also show that the combination of low price and strict return policy might be favored under very
3http://www.hp.com/sbso/buspurchase_refurbished_faq.html#return http://www.shopfujitsu.com/
www/content/products/notebooks/ordering.php
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special conditions. Moreover, parameters vary in their impacts on the variety decision and restocking
fee decision. The price of new products, cost savings from refurbishing and the tactical consumers’
expected valuations of refurbished products have more impact on the product variety decision. The
salvage value of returned products and the prevalence of the tactical consumers have more impact
on encouraging return or not. By protecting the consumer against a lemon product, allowing returns
enables the seller to serve the tactical consumers with refurbished products and charge a relatively
high price even when their expected valuation is low. In this way, both the seller and the consumer
benefit from allowing returns. The results also suggest that sellers should deliberately consider the
market segment conditions, consumer valuations, and cost factors to choose the appropriate price and
restocking fees for refurbished products.
There are several ways to extend the current research. The first is to take a dynamic perspective.
This paper considers only a single time period assuming there are already enough refurbished prod-
ucts available to serve different market segments. An interesting extension would be to consider a
muti-period model in which the refurbished products are explicitly linked to consumer returns of new
products in a previous period. Another extension is to incorporate the limited inventory of refurbished
products. It would be worthwhile to investigate how the limited inventory would change the consumer
behavior and the seller’s decisions. Although the results here are obtained under a linear utility function,
the insights regarding the pricing and restocking fee decision might be generalized beyond this special
case (see Jin et al. (2007) for the case of nonlinear utility function). Moreover, manufacturers such as
Dell use different items to represent different quality conditions of refurbished products. For example,
a “reconditioned” product may refer to an effectively new product, while a “remanufactured” product
may have been returned to the OEM and subjected to an extensive remanufacturing process. Whether
the manufacturer should provide this information is worth investigating.
32
CHAPTER 3. ROBUST DESIGN OF A CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN
NETWORK FOR UNCERTAIN CARBON REGULATIONS AND RANDOM
PRODUCT FLOWS
3.1 Introduction
Environmental and economic factors have motivated firms to plan their supply chain structures to
handle both forward and reverse flows of products. Activities in the reverse supply chain occur due to
commercial and consumer returns, or to capture the potential profits derived from remanufacturing and
resale. For example, the annual costs of commercial returns in the US exceed $100 billion (Atasu et al.,
2008). Usually, these items are shipped back to the manufacturer from the retailer. The reverse flows
are also compelled by various regulations (Atasu et al., 2009). Many state-operated programs in the US
require the manufacturer to collect and recycle electronic waste (e-waste) (Gui et al., 2010). This leads
to the idea of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management. According to Guide and Van Wassenhove
(2009), CLSC management focuses on “the design, control, and operation of a system to maximize
value creation over the entire life cycle of a product with dynamic recovery of value from different
types and volumes of returns over time” (p.10). One of the most important strategic decisions in a
firm’s CLSC management is its network design. As the CLSC network is expected to be in use for a
considerable amount of time, the firm should consider all the possible factors that will affect the design
decisions.
One important factor is the potential environmental regulation. In recent decades, concerns over
global climate change are increasingly focusing attention on both the fuel costs and the carbon emis-
sions that result from transporting goods. Although subject to political vagaries, regulation of carbon
emissions is becoming inevitable. Compared to a more rigid command-and-control policy, market-
based environmental mechanisms that put a price on greenhouse gas emissions are usually favored
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because they provide incentives for emission reduction. The market-based approach has been proven
effective in controlling sulphur dioxide in the US and has been instituted elsewhere, to reduce the carbon
emissions. For example, in 2005 the European Union instituted a carbon emission trading scheme (EU
ETS) for the energy-intensive industries with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least
20% below 1990 levels (Bohringer et al., 2009). Also, the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme
(NZ ETS) was introduced in 2009 (Jiang et al., 2009). In 2011, Australia’s government announced the
details of a carbon tax plan (Siriwardana et al., 2011). Such emission regulations aim to eventually
emission reductions in all economic sectors, among which transportation is a main source of emissions.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), 33.2% of carbon emission are from
the transportation sector (EIA., 2009). Therefore, it is not surprising that several world regions includ-
ing California and Canada are discussing cap-and-trade systems that would include the transportation
sector (Flachsland et al., 2011).
A firm that wishes to proactively design a CLSC in anticipation of market mechanisms to control
carbon emissions faces multiple forms of uncertainty. The first question is the type of policy (carbon
tax or cap-and-trade system) that may be administered. In major carbon emitting nations such as the
United States, China and Japan, there are extensive debates over which regulatory policy will be favored.
Even if the firm could know which policy will be applied, it still faces considerable uncertainty about
the magnitudes of incentives or penalties and the stringency of constraints. Carbon emission permit
prices elsewhere have exhibited considerable volatility. In the EU ETS, the permit price increased from
around 7 euros in January, 2005 to above 30 euros in April, 2006, before crashing to below 10 euros
within 3 days. It then rose again and stabilized above 15 euros for about 4 months before decreasing
to nearly zero by mid-2007 (Benz and Tru¨ck, 2009). Such behavior implies that estimation of credible
probability distributions for carbon prices based on historical data might be very difficult. Second,
forecasting consumer demand is a perennial challenge even with the aid of historical or market research
information to inform the construction of a probability distribution, and forecasting return flows is even
harder.
Designing a CLSC network involves long-term decisions to invest in fixed facilities such as man-
ufacturing or remanufacturing plants, warehouses, and collection facilities. It also involves decisions
concerning the transportation modes between different facilities. The goal of this paper is to formulate
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a tractable CLSC network design problem, and solve it to obtain a facility configuration that is ro-
bust to variations in possible carbon emission regulations while enabling responsiveness to the random
variations in retailer demands and returns.
We propose a two-stage, multi-period stochastic programming model in which the demands for new
products and returns of those products are discrete random variables. Then we extend this formulation
to incorporate two carbon regulation policies: tax or cap and trade. By analyzing the similarity in the
effects of the two regulation policies, we propose a hybrid model that could account for them both. The
carbon prices or tax rates are characterized as uncertain parameters within certain sets, and a robust opti-
mization method based on Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1999, 2000) is adopted to handle such uncertainty.
Based on the possible primary scenarios the decision maker has, tractable forms of a robust counterpart
under box and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets are developed. A case study shows how the optimal network
configuration balances the trade-offs among investment costs, transportation costs and carbon emission
costs. The network configurations obtained under the “carbon-incorporated” model are different from
those obtained under a “carbon-free” model. More facilities will be opened to reduce the distance trav-
eled, and transportation modes with lower carbon emission rates will be favored as the uncertainty in
either carbon emission regulation policy increases (in terms of carbon permit price or carbon tax). The
total expected carbon emissions and total cost will also increase as the product flow variability increas-
es. Simpler formulations under deterministic demands and returns as well as nominal carbon prices or
tax rates are also derived. Numerical experiments show how, if the ellipsoidal uncertainty set is adopted,
the decision maker can balance the trade-off between robustness and cost by changing the size of the
ellipsoidal set. Also, compared to the nominal carbon prices or tax rates model, the robust model yields
solutions that provide protection under the worst-case scenario without being overly conservative. This
paper contributes to the literature by formulating the network design problem with multiple types of
uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that solves the CLSC network design
problem with the combination of robust optimization and stochastic programming to address the effects
of uncertain environmental regulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature related to
our work. In Section 3, we provide the two-stage, multi-period stochastic programming model without
consideration of carbon emissions, then extend it to include the possible carbon emission regulations.
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Hybrid model of both possible regulation policies is provided in Section 4, where we also proposed the
tractable robust counterparts under box and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets. We present case studies and
computational results in Section 5 and finish the paper with concluding remarks in Section 6.
3.2 Literature Review
Supply chain network design problems have been relatively well-studied both for forward-only sup-
ply chain and for CLSCs (see Melo et al. (2009) and Akc¸alı et al. (2009) for reviews). Traditionally,
mixed-integer programming (MIP) models are commonly used. These models range from simple unca-
pacitated facility location models to complex capacitated multi-stage or multi-commodity models. Their
common objective is to determine the least cost system design, which usually involves making tradeoffs
among fixed opening costs of facilities and variable transportation costs. Various solution methods have
been developed to solve the network design problem but only a few studies have considered the uncer-
tain nature of various input parameters in a strategic planning horizon through scenario-based stochastic
programming (Santoso et al., 2005; Listes, 2007). Those papers use probabilistic optimization methods
which take advantage of known or estimated probability distributions for the data. But these scenario-
based optimization methods encounter difficulty if a discrete probability distribution of the uncertain
parameters is largely unknown (Bertsimas et al., 2004).
To overcome this shortcoming, a robust optimization methodology was first developed by Soyster
(1973) and then further developed by Mulvey et al. (1995), El Ghaoui and Lebret (1997), and Ben-Tal
and Nemirovski (Ben-Tal and Nemirovski, 1999, 2000). This approach has also been applied to net-
work design problems. For the robust network flow problem, Mudchanatongsuk et al. (2007) developed
a method to solve a network flow problem under transportation cost and demand uncertainty. They
defined an affine function for the arc flows in terms of the uncertain demand and then transformed the
model into a MIP problem. Atamturk and Zhang (2007) described a two-stage robust optimization ap-
proach for solving network flow and design problems with uncertain demand, including both capacity
allocation and routing decisions. That work focuses on the network flow problems and the selection of
locations for the facilities are not involved. Pishvaee et al. (2011) proposed a robust optimization model
for handling the inherent uncertainty of customer demands and transportation costs in a CLSC net-
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work design problem. Their model is a single stage robust optimization problem with box uncertainty,
which can be converted to an equivalent mixed-integer linear program. Baron et al. (2011) apply robust
optimization to the problem of locating facilities in a network facing uncertain demand over multiple
periods. They use the box and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets to characterize the demand uncertainty. The
latter two papers consider only uncertainties in the demand and/or cost data, and the effects of carbon
emission regulations are not considered.
This paper is also related to operational and strategic impacts of supply chain decisions on carbon e-
missions. Benjaafar et al. (2009) presented an extension of the lot sizing model that accounts for carbon
emissions under various regulatory policies. Also, with the increase of environmental consciousness,
those environmental parameters have also been taken into account when designing the supply chain
network (Chaabane et al., 2008; Diabat and Simchi-Levi, 2009; Ramudhin et al., 2008). These authors
have used deterministic models to study the network design problem when different regulations are tak-
en into account. But because they focus on the impact of subcontracting and production activities with
a predetermined supply chain network, the effect of carbon regulations on the network configuration is
not addressed. Hoen et al. (2010) examined the effect of two regulation mechanisms on the transport
mode selection decision when a single mode must be selected for all transport of a single item. In their
simplified setting, they found that introducing an emission cost for freight transport via either a direct
emission tax or a market mechanism such as cap and trade is not likely to result in significant changes
in transport modes and hence will not reduce emissions much.
This paper differs from previous research in several ways. First, we explicitly address the effects
of uncertain carbon emission regulations on the CLSC network configuration by incorporating two
such policies into a hybrid model. Second, this paper models the CLSC network design problem with
the combination of both robust optimization and stochastic programming methodologies. The carbon
regulation parameters characterized by prices or tax rates are modeled with uncertainty sets while the
demands and returns are represented by discrete probabilistic scenarios.
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3.3 A Two-stage Multi-period Stochastic Programming Model for CLSC Network
Design
In this paper, we consider a firm that has to design a CLSC network for a single product. The primary
decisions regard the investment in fixed facilities in anticipation of forward and reverse flows between
facilities over multiple periods. The firm must decide the locations of factories for manufacturing
new and recovering returned products. It will open separate warehouse and collection facilities for
distributing new products and collecting returned products, respectively. Modification of the model
for combined facilities to handle forward and reverse flows is straightforward. In each period, the
warehouses will satisfy the retailer demands, and returns will occur due to buyer remorse, product
malfunction and other reasons. The returned products are first shipped to the collection center, and then
transported to the factories for inspection and recovery. Several transportation modes allow the firm
to accommodate the flows between facilities. Each mode has different cost and emission implications.
The network topology is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Closed-loop supply chain network structure
This problem has a two-stage, multi-period structure. It has a two-stage structure because the first-
stage facility investment decisions must be made before the realization of demand and return scenarios.
It is multi-period because transportation flows can vary in response to changing demand and return
quantities (and in the robust extension, to changing carbon regulation parameters). After this basic
model is set up, we will extend it to incorporate the uncertainty from carbon emission regulations. In
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the extended model, investment decisions also must be made within the first-stage prior knowing which
type of regulation will be used. The product flow decisions for each subsequent period constitute the
second stage, after all uncertainties are realized. The following notation will be used throughout this
paper.
Sets and Indices
P set of potential factories for manufacturing new and recovering returned products, p ∈P
W set of potential warehouses for distributing new products, w ∈ W
L set of potential collection centers for returned products, l ∈ L
K set of retailer locations, k ∈ K
M set of transportation modes, m ∈M
T set of time periods, t ∈ T
S set of alternative scenarios of retailer demands and returns, s ∈ S
A set of all the arcs in the network A ≡ {i j : (i ∈ P , j ∈ W ) or (i ∈ W , j ∈ K ) or (i ∈ K , j ∈
L ) or (i ∈ L , j ∈P)}
F set of potential facilities,F = P ∪W ∪L
N set of all the nodes in the network,N = F ∪K
Parameters
ωst probability of scenario s in period t, s ∈ S , t ∈ T
dskt new product demand of retailer k under scenario s in period t, k ∈ K , s ∈ S , t ∈ T
µst return rate in period t under scenario s, s ∈ S , t ∈ T
rskt returns of retailer k under scenario s in period t, r
s
kt = µ
s
t d
s
kt. k ∈ K , s ∈ S , t ∈ T .
ci jm unit transportation cost from node i to node j using transportation mode m, i j ∈ A ,m ∈M
fi the investment cost for building facility, i ∈ F
Λit maximum capacity of facility i in period t, i ∈ F , t ∈ T
βi j distance (km) from node i to node j, i, j ∈ A
τm carbon emission factor (g/ton-km) for transportation mode m, m ∈M
w unit weight of product (ton)
αt carbon tax rate in period t (dollar per ton), t ∈ T
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φt average spot price of emission allowance in period t (dollar), t ∈ T
κt number of carbon permits firm received from allocation in period t, t ∈ T
Decision Variables
xsi jtm the amount of product transported from node i to node j using transportation mode m under
scenario s in period t, i j ∈ A ,m ∈M , s ∈ S , t ∈ T
yi = 1 if facility i is opened, 0 otherwise, i ∈ F
es+t , e
s−
t the number of carbon permits the firm purchases and sells in period t under scenario s,
s ∈ S , t ∈ T
The following assumptions are used in the model.
Assumption 1. In each period, the inventory is carried by retailers. Warehouse and collection cen-
ter,which act as a break-bulk centers, do not accumulate stocks.
This means the warehouse and collection center are used as cross docking facilities, which may not
be usual in actual practice. But this is a common assumption made in previous research (Melo et al.,
2009; Santoso et al., 2005; Listes, 2007).
Assumption 2. The firm owns the transportation vehicles. Each transportation mode has unlimited
capacity.
In this paper, we do not consider the possibility of third-party logistics. To avoid the complication
of routing and other operational decisions, we also assume that each transportation mode has unlimited
capacity, which may not be realistic in practice. Considering capacitated transportation is a topic for
additional research.
Assumption 3. Under the carbon cap-and-trade system, carbon permits can be either purchased or
sold at the same price in a given period.
Speculative trading; i.e., the buying and selling of carbon permits to benefit from the price differ-
ence, would involve formulation of the firm’s carbon permit trading strategy, which is beyond the scope
of this paper. Similar assumptions are also made in Benjaafar et al. (2009); Hua et al. (2011).
Assumption 4. Under the carbon cap-and-trade system, there is no banking or investment in financial
derivatives of carbon allowances.
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This assumption permits a focus on the network design decision.
Assumption 5. The returns in each period depend only on the sales volumes in that period; i.e., the
random demands, d˜kt, for retailer k in period t. The return rate µ˜t is also a random variable. We further
assume that for each retailer k, d˜1t, ..., d˜kt are mutually independent and independent of µ˜t. For each
period t, {d˜k1, ..., d˜kt} and {µ˜1, ..., µ˜t} are also mutually independent.
The retailer demands for new products and the return amounts in each period are the first source of
uncertainty. The realizations of random variables d˜kt and µ˜t can be characterized by discrete scenarios.
For each time period t, there are |S | discrete scenarios and ωst is the probability of scenario s in period
t. Thus, for each (k, t), d˜kt = dskt and µ˜t = µ
s
t with probability w
s
t , s ∈ S . Once the yi are fixed, we
are actually solving |S | × |T | subproblems to determine the flows between different facilities. The
extensive form of the two-stage multi-period stochastic programming model without carbon emission
regulations (called the baseline problem) can be then formulated as follows:
min
∑
i∈F
fiyi +
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
(ωst ci jmx
s
i jtm) (3.1)
s.t.
∑
w∈W
∑
m∈M
xswktm = d
s
kt,∀k ∈ K , s ∈ S ,∀t ∈ T (3.2)∑
l∈L
∑
m∈M
xskltm = r
s
kt,∀k ∈ K , s ∈ S ,∀t ∈ T (3.3)∑
i∈N
∑
m∈M
xsi jtm −
∑
j∈N
∑
m∈M
xsjitm = 0,∀ j ∈ W ∪L , s ∈ S ,∀t ∈ T (3.4)∑
j∈N
∑
m∈M
xsi jtm − Λityi ≤ 0,∀i ∈P , s ∈ S ,∀t ∈ T (3.5)
y ∈ {0, 1}|F |, x ∈ R|A |×|M |×|T |×|S |+ (3.6)
The objective is to minimize the long-run total cost of current investment and expected future oper-
ating costs. We do not include a discount factor for the cost over time, but the discounted model could
be readily built. Constraints (3.2) and (3.3) ensure that retailer demands are met and returned products
are collected. Constraints (3.4) ensure that the warehouse and collection facilities will not accumulate
stocks. Constraints (3.5) enforce capacity constraints of the processing nodes. If facility i is not built
(yi = 0) the constraint will force all flows into the facility to zero.
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3.3.1 Incorporating the Carbon Emission Regulation
When evaluating the firm’s carbon emission intensity, we neglect those emissions resulting from the
construction and maintenance of the facilities to focus our analysis on the logistic activities. The total
carbon emissions Γst (tons per period) from transportation under scenario s in period t can be computed
as:
Γst = w
∑
i j∈A
βi j
∑
m∈M
τmxsi jtm,∀t ∈ T , s ∈ S (3.7)
We consider two possible regulatory policies. Under a linear carbon tax scheme, the regulatory
party penalizes the units of carbon emitted in each period. For carbon tax rate αt, the problem can be
restated as:
min
∑
i∈F
fiyi +
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
(ωst ci jmx
s
i jtm) +
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
αtω
s
t Γ
s
t (3.8)
subject to constraints (3.2) – (3.7). Here, the term
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
αtω
s
t Γ
s
t is the expected future cost of the
carbon tax.
Under a cap-and-trade system, the firm will receive an allocation of carbon permits κt in each period
(i.e., the “cap”). Every permit allows the firm to emit one ton of carbon. It may emit more than its cap
if it buys additional permits from the market, and it can also sell excess permits. Under this setting, the
problem can be reformulated as follows:
min
∑
i∈F
fiyi +
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
(ωst ci jmx
s
i jtm) +
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
φtω
s
t (e
s+
t − es−t ) (3.9)
s.t. Γst − es+t + es−t ≤ κt,∀s ∈ S , t ∈ T (3.10)
es+t , e
s−
t ≥ 0 (3.11)
in addition to constraints (3.2) – (3.7). Here, the last term in the objective function is the expected
future cost or profit from the carbon trading market. Note that, although carbon emission permits are
nondivisible, for simplicity we assume they can be traded in any continuous quantity.
There are some similarities between the regulation policies. In the cap-and-trade version of the
model, which replaces (3.1) with (3.9) and includes constraints (3.10) and (3.11), for any φt ≥ 0 the net
number of permits purchased, es+t − es−t , will be as small as possible at optimality. Therefore, constraint
(3.10) will bind at optimality, so that es+t − es−t = Γst − κt will hold for every scenario and every period.
Thus,
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
φtω
s
t (e
s+
t − es−t ) =
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
φtω
s
t (Γ
s
t − κt), where
∑
t∈T
∑
s∈S
φtω
s
t κt =
∑
t∈T
φtκt. Because the
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term
∑
t∈T
φtκt will affect only the objective value but not the optimal solution, it can be dropped from
the objective function without loss of optimality. Then, the objective has the same form as that for the
carbon tax (3.8). The two policies thus can be represented in a single model as follows:
min
∑
i∈F
fiyi +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
(ci jm x¯i jtm) +
∑
t∈T
(αtΓ¯t) (3.12)
s.t. Γst − es+t + es−t = κt,∀s ∈ S , t ∈ T (3.13)
es+t , e
s−
t ≥ 0 (3.14)
along with constraints (3.2) – (3.7). Here, Γ¯t ≡ ωst Γst and x¯i jtm ≡ ωst xsi jtm represent the expected amount
of carbon emissions and the expected flows, respectively. A tax policy is represented by setting κt to a
large enough value that it does not affect the optimization and setting αt to the unit tax, while a cap-and-
trade policy is represented by setting κt to a restrictive level and letting αt represent the market price
of carbon permits. In this paper, we consider the αt and κt to be uncertain data, which vary within an
uncertainty set (U ). The distributions of {αt} and {κt} are not known but the decision maker has the
nominal data αˆt and κˆt, which are estimates of αt and κt.
There are several “easy” approximations for the problem. One is to replace the uncertain αt with
the nominal values but still retain the stochastic demands and returns in the formulation. This results in
a nominal stochastic model.
(Problem NS) : min
∑
i∈F
fiyi +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
(ci jm x¯i jtm) +
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
(αˆtΓ¯t) (3.15)
along with constraints (3.2) -(3.7) and (3.13) -(3.14). Another approximation of the problem is to
replace the stochastic demands and returns in each period with their expected values. Under this ap-
proximation, the decision variables will be yi and xi jtm, as the second stage consists of a single scenario.
The emission in each period Γt can be computed as Γt = w
∑
i j∈A
βi j
∑
m∈M
τmxi jtm,∀t ∈ T . The robust
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deterministic problem formulation can be stated as follows:
(Problem RD) : min
∑
i∈F
fiyi +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
(ci jmxi jtm) +
∑
t∈T
(αtΓt) (3.16)
s.t. Γ¯t − e+t + e−t = κt,∀t ∈ T (3.17)
s.t.
∑
w∈W
∑
m∈M
xwktm = d¯kt,∀k ∈ K ,∀t ∈ T (3.18)∑
l∈L
∑
m∈M
xkltm = r¯kt,∀k ∈ K ,∀t ∈ T (3.19)∑
i∈N
∑
m∈M
xi jtm − ∑
j∈N
∑
m∈M
x jitm = 0,∀ j ∈ W ∪L ,∀t ∈ T (3.20)∑
j∈N
∑
m∈M
xi jtm − Λityi ≤ 0,∀i ∈P ,∀t ∈ T (3.21)
y ∈ {0, 1}|F |, x ∈ R|A |×|M |×|T |+ , e+t , e−t ≥ 0, αt, κt ∈ U (3.22)
where d¯kt is the expected demand for the new products and d¯kt =
∑
s∈S
ωst d
s
kt, t = 1, ..,T . Similarly,
r¯kt is the expected amount of the returned products and r¯kt =
∑
s∈S
ωst r
s
kt, t = 1, ..,T . If we replace the
carbon permit price or tax rate in (3.16) with the estimated nominal values, we obtained the nominal
deterministic problem.
(Problem ND) : min
∑
i∈F
fiyi +
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
(ci jmxmi jt) +
∑
t∈T
(αˆtΓt) (3.23)
along with constraints (3.17) - (3.22).
3.4 Hybrid model for CLSC network design
3.4.1 Robust Optimization Methodology
The goal of robust optimization is to make decisions that are robust to any realization of the uncer-
tain data. To illustrate the robust optimization methodology we will use in this study, consider a linear
optimization problem with an objective function cT x to optimize, subject to constraints Ax ≤ b where
uncertain parameters c, A, b vary in a given uncertainty set U. The general uncertain linear optimization
problem can be stated as follows:
{min
x
cT x s.t. Ax ≤ b} (c, A, b) ∈ U (3.24)
Here the decision variables are x and the uncertain parameters c, A, b belong to a closed, bounded
and convex uncertainty set U. A solution x is robust feasible if it satisfies constraint Ax ≤ b for all
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realizations of A, b within U. Each robust feasible solution x is associated with a robust objective value
cˆ(x) = sup
c∈U
[cT x]. The purpose of robust optimization is to find a optimal solution x∗ among robust
feasible solutions x which will return the best robust objective value. Such x∗, called a robust optimal
solution, is obtained by solving the following Robust Counterpart (RC) problem (Ben-Tal et al., 2009):
min
x
{cˆ(x) = sup
c∈U
[cT x] : Ax ≤ b,∀(A, b) ∈ U} (3.25)
Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1999, 2000) show that the RC of a linear optimization problem is tractable
for most uncertainty sets. For the case of ellipsoidal uncertainty set, the RC is equivalent to a second-
order cone program (SOCP). If U is polyhedral, the robust counterpart is equivalent to a linear opti-
mization problem (Bertsimas et al., 2011).
3.4.2 Hybrid Model
The robust optimization approach is adopted here to address the policy uncertainty; i.e., we for-
mulate an uncertainty set (U ) for the combination of αt and κt, and then seek a solution to the robust
counterpart of this problem. At the same time, we retain the stochastic demands and returns in the
constraints. We introduce another variable z to represent objective function (3.12). The compact matrix
form of this hybrid model can be stated as follows, and we denote this robust stochastic formulation as
problem RS .
(Problem RS) : min
z,y,x,e+,e−
z (3.26)
s.t. ∀(α, κ) ∈ U

αT Γ¯ ≤ z − f T y − cT x¯
Γ − e+ + e− = κ
(3.27)
Bx = v˜ (3.28)
−Fy + Gx ≤ 0 (3.29)
−wτβT x + Γ = 0 (3.30)
y ∈ {0, 1}|P |, x ∈ R|A |×|M |×|T |×|S |+ , e+, e− ≥ 0 (3.31)
The vectors α, Γ¯, f , κ and τ correspond to carbon prices or tax rates, expected carbon emissions,
fixed opening costs, emission caps, and emission factors, respectively. Matrices c and β respectively
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contain transportation costs and distances between different nodes. Define Γs, es+, es− as |T |×1 vectors
∀s ∈ S , respectively, that correspond to carbon emissions and emission credits purchased and sold
under scenario s. Then, Γ is used to represent the vector that consists of Γ1, ...,Γs. Similarly, e+ is used
to represent the vector that consists of e1+, ..., es+ and e− is used to represent the vector that consists
of e1−, ..., es−. Furthermore, κ consists of | S | vectors κ1, ..., κt. The matrices H, F and G contain
coefficients of the constraints (3.5) and (3.7). Constraint (3.28) is the vector form for constraints (3.2)-
(3.4), where B is the coefficient matrix and v˜ is the matrix that consists of d˜kt, r˜kt and zero. Also, all
binary decision variables are included into the vector y, flow variables under different scenarios are
included into the matrix x and the expected flows are included in the matrix x¯. To obtain a tractable
form of problem RS , let us first consider the following two LPs:
(P1) : min
u,s
cT u (3.32)
s.t. ∀(D, e) ∈ U

Du ≤ b
Hx + s = e
(3.33)
u ≥ 0, s f ree (3.34)
and
(P2) : min
u
cT u (3.35)
s.t. Du ≤ b,∀D ∈ UD (3.36)
u ≥ 0 (3.37)
where the set UD is the projection of U on the space of the data for constraint (3.36). To solve P1, we
can apply the following:
Theorem 1. If u∗ is an optimal solution of P2 with objective value v, then (u∗, e − Hu∗) is an optimal
solution of P1 with the same objective value v.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume u∗2 is an optimal solution for P2 but there is no optimal (u1, s1) for
P1 with u1 = u∗2. This means we can find a solution u
∗
1 that satisfies Du
∗
1 ≤ b, Hu∗1 + s = e and
cT u∗1 < c
T u∗2. Let Ω1 and Ω2 denote the feasible regions of P1 and P2, respectively, where Ω1 = {(u, s) :
Du ≤ b,Hu + s = e,∀(D, e) ∈ U , u ≥ 0} and Ω2 = {u : Du ≤ b,∀A ∈ UD, u ≥ 0} . We can see that
Ω1 ⊆ Ω2, which implies cT u∗1 ≥ cT u∗2. This contradicts our assumption and concludes the proof. 
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Based on Theorem 1, we can discard constraints (Γ − e+ + e− = κ) and construct the following
problem (RS ′) instead:
(Problem RS ′) : min
z,y,x
z (3.38)
s.t. αT Γ¯ ≤ z − f T y − cT x¯,∀α ∈ Uα (3.39)
along with constraints (3.28)-(3.31). The set Uα is the projection of set U on the space of the data for
constraint (3.39), which describes only uncertainty in α.
Corollary 1. If z∗, y∗, x∗ are an optimal solution to RS ′, and Γ∗ is the corresponding total carbon
emissions, then z∗, y∗, x∗, e+∗ = max(Γ∗ − κ, 0) and e−∗ = max(κ − Γ∗, 0) is an optimal solution to
problem RS .
Proof. Theorem 1 remains valid after introducing binary variables y where u = (x, y, z). Here the
slack variable is e−e+. If no speculative trading or banking is considered, it is expected that the firm
participates in buying or selling carbon permits only to handle the difference between their cap and their
emissions. 
From the decision maker’s point of view, how should the uncertainty set Uα be constructed? When
carbon permit prices or tax rates are considered, some primary scenarios might be gained based on the
experience of EU ETS. We could then construct the uncertainty set based on the available data and
decision maker’s attitude towards risk. Assume the actual carbon permit prices or tax rates, αt, are
unknown but bounded by a symmetric interval around an estimated nominal value. That is, αt ∈ ∆t =
[αˆt − δt, αˆt + δt], where αˆt is the nominal value and δt < αˆt are the possible deviations in each period.
We will then present two possible uncertainty sets, box and ellipsoidal that the decision maker could
use.
3.4.2.1 Hybrid Model under Box Uncertainty Set
A box uncertainty set may be represented by Ubox = {α ∈ Rn : |αt − αˆt| ≤ δt}, and n = |T |. Define
Wt = αˆt + δt, which is the worst case scenario of carbon prices or tax rates in each period. The problem
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RS ′ under box uncertainty can be represented as follows:
min
z,y,x
z (3.40)
s.t. max
α∈Uα
{αT Γ¯} ≤ z − f T y − cT x¯ (3.41)
along with constraints (3.28)-(3.31), and the problem RS ′ under box uncertainty set is further equivalent
to the following worst-case stochastic problem:
(Problem WS:) min
z,y,x,λ
z (3.42)
s.t. WT Γ¯ ≤ z − f T y − cT x¯ (3.43)
along with constraints (3.28)-(3.31), where W is the vector of {Wt}. Considering Γ¯ ≥ 0, it is straight-
forward that max{αT Γ¯} = WT Γ¯. This is the same approach proposed by Soyster (1973). The robust
optimal solution would be obtained by solving the problem assuming the carbon permit price or tax
rate in period t is Wt. Although the resulting problem WS is a MILP which could be solved effectively,
choosing such an uncertainty set is very conservative.
3.4.2.2 Hybrid Model under Ellipsoidal Uncertainty Set
For the network design problem, the decision maker might be interested in a set of problem RS ′
solutions (x, y, z) ∈ Ψ() such that (x, y, z) will violate the constraint (3.39) with probability at most .
The set Ψ() can be represented by following chance constraint (Miller and Wagner, 1965):
Ψ() = {(x, y, z) : Pr(αT Γ¯ > z − f T y − cT x¯) < } (3.44)
where Γ¯ = ωT Γ. We want to design an uncertainty set such that the probability is guaranteed and the
robust solution is feasible without being overly conservative. One way to design such an uncertainty set
is to use an ellipsoidal set:
Uellips = {α ∈ Rn :
n∑
t=1
δ−2t (αt − αˆt)2 ≤ ρ2} (3.45)
Using P to denote the diagonal matrix with entries δt, an equivalent representation is Uellips =
{αˆ + Pu : ‖u‖2 ≤ ρ}. The problem RS ′ under ellipsoidal uncertainty set can be represented as follows
48
(denoted as problem RS ′ellips ):
min
z,y,x
z (3.46)
s.t. max
‖u‖2≤ρ
{(αˆT + (Pu)T )Γ¯} ≤ z − f T y − cT x¯ (3.47)
along with constraints (3.28)-(3.31).
Theorem 2. The problem RS ′ellips is equivalent to the following problem:
min
z,y,x,λ
z (3.48)
s.t. αˆT Γ¯ + ρ‖PT Γ¯‖2 ≤ z − f T y − cT x¯ (3.49)
along with constraints (3.28)-(3.31).
Proof. The left-hand side in constraint (3.47) is αˆT Γ¯+ max
‖u‖2≤ρ
(Pu)T Γ¯, where max
‖u‖2≤ρ
(Pu)T Γ¯ = max
‖u‖2≤ρ
√
((Pu)T Γ¯)2.
According to the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, ((Pu)T Γ¯)2 ≤ (PT Γ¯)2(uT )2 ≤ (PT Γ¯)2ρ2. Thus, max
‖u‖2≤ρ
(Pu)T Γ¯ ≤
ρ‖PT Γ¯‖2, which concludes the proof. 
We can get different sets by varying the value of the uncertainty budget ρ. For ρ = 0, Uellips shrinks
to the nominal data αˆt. For ρ = 1, Uellips is the largest ellipsoid contained in Ubox. For ρ =
√
n, which
is the worst case uncertainty budget Uellips is the smallest volume ellipsoid containing the Ubox. Ben-
Tal and Nemirovski (2000) have proved that the feasible solutions will violate constraint (3.39) with
probability at most exp(−ρ2/2). For example, ρ = 3.0349 will guarantee at least 0.99 feasibility. But
for problems with a small number of uncertain data, this bound is not particularly attractive, and we can
obtain a tighter bound based on Dufour and Hallin’s work.
Theorem 3. If the uncertainty intervals are given by ∆t = [αˆt − δt, αˆt + δt] and (x, y, z) is a feasible
solution of problem, then Pr{αT Γ¯ > z − f T y − cT x¯} < B(ρ, t) as tabulated in Table 3 of Dufour and
Hallin (1993).
Proof. Dufour and Hallin derive the probability bound for | n∑
i=1
aiYi| ≥ y where
n∑
i=1
a2i = 1 and random
variables |Yi| ≤ 1,∀i = 1, ..., n. The uncertainty in carbon permit price in each period t can be represented
by α˜t = αˆt + ηtδt, where the random variable ηt obeys an unknown but symmetric distribution on
[−1, 1]. Then Pr{αT Γ¯ > z − f T y − cT x¯} = Pr{ n∑
i=1
(α˜t + ηtδt)Γ¯t > z − f T y − cT x¯}, and z − f T y − cT x¯ ≥
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n∑
i=1
α˜tΓ¯t + ρ
√
n∑
i=1
(δtΓ¯t)2 from constraint (3.49). So we have Pr{αT Γ¯ > z − f T y − cT x¯} < Pr{
n∑
i=1
ηtδtΓ¯t >
ρ
√
n∑
i=1
(δtΓ¯t)2} < Pr{
n∑
i=1
ηtδtΓ¯t ≥ ρ
√
n∑
i=1
(δtΓ¯t)2}. Let pt = δtΓ¯t/
√
n∑
i=1
(δtΓ¯t)2}, and
n∑
i=1
p2t = 1. Then we
have Pr{αT Γ¯ > z − f T y − cT x¯} < Pr{ n∑
i=1
ηt pt ≥ ρ} ≤ Pr{|
n∑
i=1
ηt pt| ≥ ρ}. This probability bound can be
derived based on the Proposition 1 of Dufour and Hallin (1993). 
We should note that bound in Dufour and Hallin (1993) is tighter than exp(−ρ2/2). For example,
based on Dufour and Hallin’s calculation, 0.99 feasibility will be guaranteed at ρ = 2.686. Thus, the
decision maker can easily balance the trade-off between robustness and performance by changing the
size of ellipsoidal set. In addition, even though the problem RS ′ellips is a mixed-integer second order cone
program (MISOCP), it can be solved efficiently by some commercial solvers, e.g., the ILOG CPLEX
Optimizer.
3.5 Computational Experiments
In this section, we describe numerical experiments to understand the impact of uncertainties on the
CLSC network configuration. Specifically, we investigate the impacts of carbon emission regulation
uncertainty and product flow variability on the number of facilities opened, transportation mode selec-
tion, total carbon emissions and total cost. Before presenting the results, we first describe the detailed
method to generate the parameters.
3.5.1 Parameter Generation
All the parameters are randomly generated according to uniform distributions. The candidate facili-
ty locations are randomly generated in a [0, 5000]× [0, 5000] square. The fixed cost fi ($M) of opening
a factory, warehouse, or collection center are randomly generated according to uniform distributions on
[5, 8], [0.5, 1.5], and [0.125, 0.5], respectively. Capacities of the factory, warehouse and collection cen-
ter in each period Λit are randomly generated according to uniform distributions on [2.5, 4], [0.25, 0.75],
[0.062, 0.25] (Million units), respectively. We assume that only the road transport options are available
and do not consider rail, water and air transport. For the transportation modes, the calculations of carbon
emission factors are based on data from Pirog et al. (2001). The cost per km per ton is calculated based
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on the data from Byrne et al. (2006), which is calculated based on fuel costs, capital costs, operation
and maintenance cost over the fleet’s life cycle and adjusted by incorporating the weight consideration.
The distance between any two locations is considered to be the Euclidean distance (with kilometer as
distance unit). We further assume that the weight of 1, 000 units is one ton; i.e., w=1000g.
In each period, three scenarios for new product demand are considered, namely low (L), medium
(M) and High (H). The following steps are used to generate demands and returns of each retailer in each
period:
1. For t = 1 to T :
2. The probabilityωLt is randomly generated between [0.3, 0.35],ω
M
t is randomly generated between
[0.3, 0.35] and ωHt = 1 − (ω1t + ω2t ).
3. For k = 1 to K :
4. Low, medium and high demand scenarios dLkt, d
M
kt and d
H
kt are randomly generated in [800, 2000],
[3000, 6000], and [8000, 10000], respectively. The return rates under the low, medium and high demand
scenarios, µLt , µ
M
t , and µ
H
t are randomly generated in [0.05, 0.08], [0.07, 0.1] and [0.08, 0.12], respec-
tively.
5. Next k
6. Next t.
Table 3.1 Characteristics of road transport options
Transport Mode Fuel Type CO2 Emissions Factor Cost per Km per Ton
(g/ton-km)
1.Heavy–duty Truck Diesel 62 0.47
2.Mid–size Truck Diesel 122 0.32
3.Light Truck Gasoline 459 0.19
In the computational experiments, the estimated carbon price αˆt is randomly generated in [5, 30]
while the δt is randomly generated in [4, 10] to satisfy αˆt−δt ≥ 0. The randomly generated αˆt and δt will
be discarded if δt > αt. Based on the discussion of the uncertainty set, only the ellipsoidal uncertainty
set are considered in this experiment so we abbreviate RS ′ellips as RS . The proposed problems RS and
RD are implemented in GAMS and solved by CPLEX 11.0 MIQCP solver. The baseline problem and
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problem NS are solved by CPLEX 11.0 MIP solver. The data are manipulated by GDXMRW utilities
with Matlab (Michael C. Ferris, 2011). All computations are carried out on an Intel Core(TM)2 Quad
CPU 3.00 GHz, 3.25 GB RAM computer.
3.5.2 Network Configuration under Different Problem Formulation
To investigate how the optimal network configurations are affected by different model formulations,
we first generate a test problem with 10 potential factories, 15 potential warehouse locations, 10 poten-
tial collection centers and 30 retailers with n = 6 planning periods and uncertainty budget ρ = 2.45. The
locations for retailers and potential facilities are shown in Figure 3.2. We then solve the baseline case,
problem ND, problem RS , problem NS and problem RD. Figure 3.3 shows the network configurations
under different demands and returns scenarios from the baseline problem. The arcs represent the prod-
uct flows between different nodes, where an arc between two nodes is displayed if a flow occurs of any
period between the two nodes. Different line widths are used to represent different amounts (average
over time periods) of product flow between two nodes. For the forward flow between the factory and
warehouse, the thickest line represents the product flows greater than 1 million units and the medium
thick line represent product flows greater than 0.5 million units. Between the warehouse and retailers,
the line thicknesses represent product flows greater than 100000 units and 50000 units, respectively.
The reverse flows are shown by dashed lines. The line thickness between the retailer and the collection
center represent product flows greater than 10000 units and 5000 units, respectively. Similarly, the line
thickness from the collection center to the factory represent product flow greater than 100, 000 units and
50, 000 units, respectively.
The main issue is to determine an appropriate network design that simultaneously optimizes both
forward and reverse network flows on average. The optimal solution for the baseline problem reflects
the trade–offs between the facility investment costs, transportation costs and satisfaction of the capac-
ity constraints. Generally speaking, a higher fixed cost will result in fewer facilities while a higher
transportation cost will favor more facilities. Under the baseline case, 1 factory, 3 warehouses and 1
collection center will be opened. As there are no costs other than for investment and transportation
in the baseline formulation, it is not surprising that a relatively “centralized” network configuration is
obtained where a few facilities serve different markets and each facility serves a large subregion. As the
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Figure 3.2 Customer locations and potential locations for facilities
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Figure 3.3 Optimal network configuration for baseline problem under different scenarios (a) Low; (b)
Medium; (c) High
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capacities of different transportation modes are unlimited, the light truck is favored exclusively because
it has the lowest unit transportation cost.
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Figure 3.4 Optimal network configuration and expected flows for different formulations (a) ND; (b)
NS ; (c) RD; (d) RS
The network configurations obtained when carbon regulation is considered show quite different
characteristics compared to the baseline case. If the carbon regulations are incorporated, the variable
costs include both transportation and carbon emission costs. As the carbon emission cost is proportion
to the distance traveled, more facilities will be opened to mitigate the carbon cost and we will get a
relatively “decentralized network” for problems RS , NS and RD. For problems ND and RD, 2 factories,
5 warehouse and 3 collection centers will be opened. For problem NS , 2 factories, 6 warehouse and 3
collection centers will be used. For problems RS , 2 factories, 7 warehouse and 2 collection centers will
be opened. Comparing to the baseline solution, facilities are located closer to markets.
To study the usage of transportation modes, we also calculate the shares of different transportation
modes over all scenarios (see Table 3.2 ) for the five different formulations. The portions of total flows
carried by heavy-duty truck, mid-size truck and light truck are denoted as MR1, MR2 and MR3. The
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MRm is computed as follows:
MRm =
| ∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∑
i j∈A
xsi jtm > 0|
| ∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
xsi jtm > 0|
× 100% (3.50)
Transportation modes balance the trade-offs between transportation and carbon costs. The heavy-
duty truck has a lower emission factor but higher unit cost while the light truck will lead to higher
carbon cost but lower unit transportation costs. For problems RS and RD, transportation mode 1 and 2
will be favored as they have lower emissions, while for problem NS and ND, transportation mode 2 will
be favored exclusively as the mid-size truck has the medium transportation cost and carbon emission
rate.
Table 3.2 Shares of transportation by mode
MR1 MR2 MR3
Baseline 0 0 100%
ND 0 100 % 0
NS 0 100 % 0
RD 52.88% 46.85% 0.27%
RS 49.08% 48.61% 2.31%
Figure 3.4 shows the difference in network configurations between the deterministic and the s-
tochastic problems. The network configurations under deterministic demands and returns are relatively
“centralized” while the stochastic versions are more “decentralized”. This is because the total trans-
portation cost is lower under the deterministic settings compared to the stochastic settings. Thus, under
the deterministic settings, fewer facilities will be utilized. Also, from Figure 3.4 (a) and (c) we can
observe that problems ND and RD have the same selection of facilities. This is because the optimal
network configuration is obtained by balancing the trade-off between fixed cost, transportation cost and
carbon cost. If the carbon cost under problems ND and RD lacks much impact on the total cost, then
we will get a rather similar configuration. Otherwise, the network configurations will be different be-
tween ND and RD. For comparison purposes, we reduce the transportation cost to 0.047, 0.032, 0.019
for the corresponding transportation modes. The results from resolving all the five problems are shown
in figures 3.5 and 3.6. Under this new settings, the transportation cost will be reduced, and problem RD
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have more facilities than problem ND. This means more facilities will be opened under problem RD to
further reduce the carbon costs. Problem NS and RS have different configurations under both settings.
This means if the decision maker solves problem NS rather than problem RS , the optimal network con-
figurations will be quite different. This is because under the stochastic settings, the problem will have
a higher expected carbon cost, which might have more impact on the total cost. In the next section, we
will show that problems NS and RS have different cost implications. Generally speaking, the optimal
configuration obtained under problem NS will result in a higher cost than problem RS under the worst
case scenario.
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Figure 3.5 Optimal network configuration for low transportation cost baseline problem under different
scenarios (a) Low; (b) Medium; (c) High
3.5.3 Impact of Carbon Emission Regulation Uncertainty
To study the impact of carbon emission regulation uncertainty on CLSC network, we perform a
computational experiment by varying the uncertainty budget. A larger ρ will result in the carbon prices
or tax rates varying within a larger ellipsoidal uncertainty set and, thus, the degree of uncertainty faced
by the decision maker. Thus, by purposely changing the value of ρ, we can change the volatility of the
emission regulation uncertainty. We then design 6 levels of uncertainty from ρ = 0 to ρ = 20. For
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Figure 3.6 Optimal network configuration and expected flows for different formulations under low
transportation cost (a) ND; (b) NS ; (c) RD; (d) RS
each level of uncertainty, we randomly generate 10 instances. We then compute the average number of
eacg facility type, expected total emission and total cost. We also compute the share of transportation
by each mode following equation (3.50). We use NF , NW , NC to denote the average number of factory,
warehouse and collection center that are used. Finally, we use T E and TC to denote the total expected
carbon emission and total expected cost for all periods. The complete results of the experiment are
shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Impact of carbon emission regulation uncertainty
Uncertainty Level NF NW NC MR1 MR2 MR3 T E TC
(%) (%) (%) (M ton) (M $)
0 3 7.1 5 34.14 52.69 13.17 1.52 111.29
4 3.5 7.3 5.7 58.61 29.50 11.89 1.08 127.97
8 3.6 7.6 6.1 70.97 19.91 9.13 0.93 140.88
12 3.9 7.4 5.9 89.14 7.78 3.09 0.89 152.82
16 4 7.6 6.4 94.71 3.72 1.58 0.87 164.68
20 4.2 7.7 6.3 100 0 0 0.86 176.43
Observe that more facilities will be opened as the uncertainty level increases. As the policy uncer-
57
tainty increases, it is possible that the permit will end up with a relatively high price. To counter the
emissions from transportation, more facilities will be opened to lower the distance traveled. Second, to-
tal expected emissions will decrease as the uncertainty level increases while the total expected cost will
increase as the regulation uncertainty level increases. Again, the total expected emissions will decrease
because of the possible high permit price as the policy uncertainty level increases. The total expect-
ed cost will increase due to the construction of more facilities and the employment of transportation
mode 1. Third, the share of transportation mode 1, with the lowest emission rate, will increase as the
uncertainty level increases.
3.5.4 Impact of Random Product Flow Variability
We considered three different levels of the variability, with the scenario distributions generated
above considered as medium. Under the low variability level, the probabilities of high and low demand
in each period are generated in [0.05, 0.1], while under the high variability level, the probabilities of
high and low demand in each period are generated in [0.4, 0.45]. We generated 20 instances for each
variability level. The complete results of the experiment are shown in Table 3.4. We observe that the
product flow variability has rather limited impact on the number of facilities opened and transportation
mode selection, but the total expected emission and total cost will increase as the variability level
increases.
Table 3.4 Impact of random product flow variablity
Variability Level Average SD NF NW NC MR1 MR2 MR3 T E TC
(M) (%) (%) (%) (M ton) (M $)
Low 0.064 2.8 6.3 4.8 47.34 36.99 15.67 1.19 112.43
Medium 0.117 2.9 6.8 5.2 48.83 38.37 12.80 1.30 121.33
High 0.151 3.2 7.4 4.9 47.52 37.26 15.23 1.32 125.23
3.6 Performance of the Robust Optimization Solution
Because the benefits of results solved by stochastic demands and returns have been discussed in
Birge and Louveaux (1997) and Higle (2005), we will focus our discussion on the case of stochastic
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demands and returns. To study the performance of the robust optimization solution, we first solve
problems NS , WS , and RS . Then, we compute the following values:
ZR The optimal value of problem RS
ZN The optimal value of problem NS
ZW The optimal value of problem WS
ZNW The objective value of NS solution under the worst case scenario
ZRW The objective value of RS solution under the worst case scenario
ZNW and ZRW are obtained by evaluating the optimal solutions of problem NS and RS under the
problem WS objective function, respectively. To see the relative gap between those values, we also
compute RWR =
ZW−ZR
ZR
, RNR =
ZRS−ZNS
ZNS
and RNRW =
ZNW−ZRW
ZRW
. The quantity RNR is the relative loss
of optimality of the robust solution compared results from the nominal data of carbon prices or tax
rates. The ratio RWR is the relative improvement of the robust solution on the results with the worst
case of carbon prices or tax rates. The quantity RNRW is the relative improvement of the robust solution
compared with the results from the nominal data of carbon prices or tax rates if the worst case carbon
prices or tax rates were to occur.
For the experiment, we considered four different protection levels and generated 30 random in-
stances for network configuration with 6 potential plant locations and 10 potential locations for ware-
house, 7 potential locations for collection center and 20 retailer locations, respectively. Those random
instances are solved with different ρ. The length of the horizon is set to be 12. The other parameters are
generated according the aforementioned method. The computation time for problems NS and WS are
less than 1 minutes while the solver took 10-15 minutes to solve problem RS . We report the mean and
standard deviation for the results in Table 3.5.
As we observe from Table 3.5, ZW ≥ ZR ≥ ZN and ZNW ≥ ZRW ≥ ZW . RWR decreases, RNR increases
and NRW increases as the protection level increases. Problem NS provides an unrealistically optimistic
approximation to the true problem while problem WS offers a conservative strategy to solve the true
problem. The optimal solution under proposed problem RS lies between the “best solution” obtained
by solving problem NS and the “worst solution” obtained by solving problem WS . Formulating the
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Table 3.5 Results under different protection level (Mean ± standard deviation) | T |= 12
Protection level ρ ZN ZR ZW ZNW ZRW RNR RWR RNRW
(M $) (M $) (M $) (M $) (M $) (%) (%) (%)
80% 1.575 163.29 172.9 181.59 183.73 182.27 5.89 5.01 0.79
± 19.06 ± 20.17 ± 21.41 ± 21.71 ± 21.33 ± 0.75 ± 0.71 ± 0.4
90% 1.901 163.29 174.73 181.59 183.73 182.11 7.02 3.91 0.88
± 19.06 ± 20.39 ± 21.41 ± 21.71 ± 21.36 ± 0.88 ± 0.6 ± 0.42
95% 2.174 163.29 176.23 181.59 183.73 182.04 7.94 3.02 0.92
± 19.06 ± 20.53 ± 21.41 ± 21.71 ± 21.33 ± 1 ± 0.48 ± 0.49
99.9% 2.686 163.29 178.85 181.59 183.73 181.93 9.53 1.52 0.99
± 19.06 ± 20.96 ± 21.41 ± 21.71 ± 21.42 ± 1.19 ± 0.35 ± 0.48
problem as WS might be too conservative to be of real interest. Formulating the problem as NS seems
promising considering the cost savings between the solutions of problem NS and RS . But problem
NS can only account for an “average” situation of the carbon prices or tax rates, not the variability in
carbon prices or tax rates. Problem RS , on the other hand, allows the decision maker to choose between
robustness and performance. For example, setting ρ = 1.575, the problem RS does not immunize
much against uncertainty, but the solutions perform close to the problem NS . Setting ρ = 2.686, the
performance of problem RS decreases as the model provides higher protection against the uncertainties
in carbon prices or tax rates. In addition, under the worst case scenario, solutions of problem RS
always provide a lower cost than solutions of problem NS , the percentage of cost saving varying from
0.79% − 0.99%. Moreover, as the protection level increases, the solution of problem RS will perform
better than the solution of problem NS under the worst case scenario.
For this experiment, the number of uncertain coefficients of problem RS is only 12. To see that the
attractiveness of formulating the problem as RS will increase as the number of uncertain data increases,
we perform another experiment with the length of horizon | T |= 20. As we can observe from Table
3.6, the gap between ZR and ZN decreases and the gap between ZR and ZW increases as the horizon
increases for different level of protections. This result is similar to that of Bertsimas and Thiele (2006).
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Table 3.6 Results under different protection level (Mean ± standard deviation) | T |= 20
Protection level ρ ZN ZR ZW ZNW ZRW RNR RWR RNRW
(M $) (M $) (M $) (M $) (M $) (%) (%) (%)
80% 1.580 240.16 252.63 268.87 272.65 270.97 5.18 6.41 0.64
± 40.13 ±42.32 ±45.51 ±45.88 ±45.88 ±0.54 ±0.92 ±0.59
90% 1.911 240.16 255.33 268.87 272.65 270.82 6.3 5.29 0.7
± 40.13 ± 42.94 ± 45.51 ± 45.88 ± 46.03 ± 0.67 ± 0.75 ± 0.59
95% 2.194 240.16 257.28 268.87 272.65 270.7 7.1 4.5 0.74
± 40.13 ± 43.36 ± 45.51 ± 45.88 ± 46.01 ± 0.78 ± 0.68 ± 0.63
99.9% 2.736 240.16 261 268.87 272.65 270.46 8.66 3.01 0.83
± 40.13 ± 43.97 ± 45.51 ± 45.88 ± 45.82 ± 0.86 ± 0.56 ± 0.52
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we consider a closed-loop supply chain network design problem where the demand-
s and returns of products are stochastic variables. To cope with the uncertainty in carbon emission
regulations, two regulatory policies are considered and a robust extension of a stochastic program is
proposed. Further, tractable robust counterparts of the proposed hybrid model are developed to find the
robust solutions for box and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets. A case study illustrate how optimal network
configuration balances the trade-offs between investment, transportation and carbon emission costs if
the carbon regulation is incorporated. More facilities will be opened and the total expected cost will
increase as the uncertainty level increases. Moreover, the share of transportation by the low-emitting
modes will also increase as the regulation policy uncertainty level increases. The problem formulation
with nominal carbon prices or tax rates provides an unrealistically optimistic estimation of the real prob-
lem while the worst case scenario problem provides a conservative solution. The problem formulation
with ellipsoidal uncertainty set allows the decision maker to balance the trade-off between robustness
and performance. In addition, the proposed model can provide certain protection under the worst case
scenario.
The methodology presented in this paper can be applied to the planning of other systems as well.
The integration of discrete optimization with robust methods that address policy uncertainty and s-
tochastic formulations that use available probabilistic information will enable the decision maker to
reduce different types of risk and derive better managerial insights. Many possible extensions could be
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made on this topic. For example, addressing the problem in a multi-product setting, considering oper-
ational issues such as inventory management or routing, of combining logistics outsourcing decisions
together with the network design problem would be interesting topics for future research. It would also
be interesting to study how the impact of policy uncertainty would affect firm’s participation in CLSC
activities. Other extensions could be made to relax the assumptions on speculative trading and banking,
and to study how the CLSC network design will be affected when firm’s carbon permit trading strategy
is taken into condition.
62
CHAPTER 4. AN INTEGRATED MODEL FOR PRODUCT RETURN
MANAGEMENT AND CLOSED-LOOP SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK DESIGN
UNDER UNCERTAIN CARBON COST
4.1 Introduction
Product returns are an essential part of the exchange process between firms and consumers. Large
retailers can have return rates in excess of 10% of their sales, and the total costs of commercial returns
exceed $100 billion per year (Atasu et al., 2008). The most common mechanism of mitigating con-
sumers’ regret from purchasing is to refund some portion of the price. Both empirical and theoretical
study has proven the significance of the return policy. For example, marketing and economics research
has confirmed that the return policy reduces consumer risk and provides a better match between con-
sumers’ needs and product quality (Mann and Wissink, 1988, 1990; Heiman et al., 2001). Also, a
lenient return policy will increase purchase rates and product return rates for customers in remote pur-
chase environments (Wood, 2001). Thus, a critical challenge for the manager is to understand how a
return policy, that allows refunds for any reason, affects the consumer purchase and return decisions.
From the manufacturer’s perspective, it is their responsibility to manage the forward product flows
to retailers and the reverse flows of the returned products. Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009) defined
closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management as: “The design, control, and operation of a system to
maximize value creation over the entire life cycle of a product with dynamic recovery of value from
different types and volumes of returns over time” (p.10). One important strategic decision in a firm’s
planning and operation is the design of such a CLSC network. This process involves determining the
locations of the factories, warehouses and collection centers. The firm also must establish the capacity
for each facility to deliver the product to consumers and collect the returned products. In a general
sense, those facilities are expected to be in use for a relatively long time; thus, the manufacturer must
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consider all the factors that might affect the network design decisions.
Besides the cost factors and the demand and return quantities, the manufacturer must also anticipate
the impacts of possible environmental regulations on its operations. In recent years, concerns over
global warming caused by the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide have increased. As the
transportation sector is a main source of carbon emissions, it is not surprising that several countries are
considering including the transportation sector in carbon emission regulations. For example, the United
States, Japan and Canada are discussing cap-and-trade systems that would include the transportation
sector. A carbon tax system is proposed by the Australia government. The EU Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS) does not include road transport but is adding the aviation sector in 2012 (Flachsland
et al., 2011). For a manufacturer, the actual costs that will result from carbon regulations are not clear
because of the uncertainty about the type of policy that will be administered (carbon tax or cap–and–
trade system), and its stringency.
Thus, a manufacturer that needs to design a CLSC network with heavy logistic activities should
anticipate the possible cost due to the carbon regulations. Moreover, the retailer should understand
the role of its return policy in consumers’ purchasing and return behavior. Frequently, those two de-
cisions are examined separately because manufacturers and retailers are responsible for the network
design decision and the refund for the new product, respectively. However, if the manufacturer can
control the return process via the return policy design, then integrating the return policy decision in-
to the design process of the CLSC network might improve the overall performance. This situation
occurs if the manufacturer owns retail stores (Wang et al., 2009). Besides the traditional retail chan-
nel, some manufacturers like Apple, Bally, Nike and Ralph Lauren sell the product to end consumers
through company-owned stores. Moreover, outlet malls in the US consist of a substantial number of
manufacturer-owned retail stores.
The purpose of this paper is to formulate and solve an integrated model for product return man-
agement and CLSC network design considering uncertain carbon costs. We first derive consumers’
expected demands and returns as a result of the firm’s return policy, the probability of receiving an
unsatisfactory product and the consumers’ product valuation. The network design decisions, including
facility capacities and locations, occur in the initial period. In the following periods, the firm observes
the demand and return quantities, and then determines the allocation of shipments to facilities to sat-
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isfy demands and collect the returns. After this basic CLSC network design model is established, it is
then extended to include uncertain carbon emission costs from potential regulations (e.g., carbon tax or
cap–and–trade system). We assume that the firm has only estimates and ranges of the possible carbon
costs in each period, and no other probability distribution information is available. We adopt the robust
optimization (RO) approach developed by Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998, 1999, 2000), and represent
the carbon cost uncertainty in each period by an ellipsoidal uncertainty set. The nonlinearity in the
profit introduced by the refund decision is approximated as piecewise linear for tractable and accurate
solution.
We compare the robust optimization model with a basic model, where no carbon cost is considered,
and a nominal data model in terms of the solutions they provide. In a numerical case study with carbon
costs estimated from the EU ETS, the solutions of the basic model and the nominal data model are very
similar because emissions account for only a small portion of the total cost. However, the RO solutions
feature more forward supply chain facilities, smaller optimal refunds, and fewer collection centers for
returns. Extensive parametric experiments are performed to study the impact of different parameters
on the profit, the refund provided and the network topology. The optimal solutions must balance the
tradeoffs between revenues, transportation costs, and emission-related operational costs. We find that
introducing carbon regulation might result in an “environmental paradox”. Uncertainty in the carbon
cost reduces the optimal value of the refund, which means more unwanted products might go to landfill
instead of being recycled or reused.
This paper contributes to the literature by formulating an integrated model for product return man-
agement and CLSC network design subject to uncertain carbon cost. The extensive numerical results
improve our understanding of the effects of various parameters on both problem aspects. In addition,
it contributes to a solution method designed for models with quadratic terms as well as ellipsoidal
uncertainty.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the relationship
between our work and the existing literature. In section 3, expected demand and return quantities are
derived as functions of the refund and a basic CLSC network design model is proposed. This basic
model is then extended to include the uncertain carbon cost. The computational issues and piecewise
linear approximation are discussed in section 3. We conduct extensive parametric analysis to illustrate
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the impact of different parameters in section 4 and conclude the paper in section 5.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section, we briefly review some of the related streams of studies in product return man-
agement, supply network design and robust optimization. Marketing and economics research have
confirmed that a return policy is very important in the product exchange process. Davis et al. (1995)
determine conditions when the return policy will enhance the retailer’s profit. They use an analytical
model to help identify potential causes for variation among retailers’ return policies (Davis et al., 1998).
Wood (2001) finds that the return policy is very important in e-commerce and a lenient return policy
will increase consumers’ purchases as well as returns in that context. Anderson et al. (2009) quantify
the value of returns by developing a model that incorporates consumers’ order and return decisions.
They illustrate that the firm must balance both demand and cost to identify the optimal return policy. A
review paper that summarizes consumers’ return behavior is provided by Petersen and Kumar (2009).
They argue that return policy should be an important aspect of product management as it affects con-
sumers’ future purchase behavior. The role of a return policy is also studied extensively in the field of
operations management, where scholars have investigated how to use a return policy to improve opera-
tions efficiency (Liu and Xiao, 2008; Shulman et al., 2009; Su, 2009; Ketzenberg and Zuidwijk, 2009).
Among them, Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2004) examine the case where the price and return policy
are decision variables. They use linear functions for the demand and return quantities as a result of
the two decisions. Mukhopadhyay and Setoputro (2005) extend their analysis to explore the value of
offering a refund for build-to-order products, which is enabled through the modular design.
There is a considerable amount of literature on network design problems. In most CLSC network
design studies, the demands and returns are either deterministic or characterized by discrete scenarios
that are independent of firm’s decisions (Faccio et al., 2011; Easwaran and U¨ster, 2010). In contrast,
we assume the firm can affect the expectations consumer demands and returns by designing the return
policy. Our work is also related to studies (Chaabane et al., 2008; Diabat and Simchi-Levi, 2009;
Ramudhin et al., 2008), in which the environmental parameters are taken into consideration. But those
studies focus on the contract and subcontract activities within a forward-only supply chain network.
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The robust optimization methodology was developed by El Ghaoui and Lebret (1997), El Ghaoui
et al. (1998), and Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998, 1999, 2000). The goal of this approach is to provide
solutions that are less conservative than the earlier worst-case solutions developed by Soyster (1973).
We refer the reader to a textbook for comprehensively understanding the subject (Ben-Tal et al., 2009).
In the area of network design, Pishvaee et al. (2011) proposed a robust optimization model for handling
the inherent uncertainty of input data (customer demands and transportation costs) in a CLSC. Their
model is a single stage robust optimization problem with box uncertainty, which can be converted to
a equivalent mixed-integer linear program. Baron et al. (2011) consider a multi-period fixed-charge
network location problem using robust optimization. They use box and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets to
characterize the uncertainty in consumers’ demand.
In a similar context, Gao and Ryan (2011b) address a multi-period capacitated CLSC network de-
sign problem subject to uncertainties in the demands and returns as well as the potential carbon emission
regulations, in a similar setting to this paper. But here we focus on the situation where the manufacturer
has the control over the return process and incorporates the refund decision into the network design
problem. Thus, this paper combines product return management and supply chain network design,
which are usually examined separately. Consumers’ expected demands and returns are derived as a
function of the firm’s return policy, and then incorporated into the CLSC network design problem. In
addition, we also consider the uncertain carbon cost caused by the possible carbon emission regulation,
and formulate a RO model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research that simultaneously
addresses all these aspects in the context of network design.
4.3 Problem Statement
We consider an organization that is responsible for designing a single product CLSC network to
serve retailers at various locations, and is also responsible for designing the return policy for the re-
tailers. The retailer must satisfy consumers’ demand and accept returns in its geographic region. The
locations of facilities for manufacturing new and recovering returned products are to be established. We
assume that the firm opens separate warehouse and collection facilities for distributing new products
and collecting returned products, respectively. The model can be extended easily to handle integrated
67
warehouse and collection/testing centers. In each period, the retailers’ demands are satisfied by the
warehouses, and returns arise due to buyer remorse, product malfunction and other reasons. The col-
lection centers collect the returned products and then ship them to a factory for inspection and recovery.
Furthermore, several transportation modes are available for the firm to accommodate the flows between
facilities. Each mode has different cost and emission implications. We further assume that each mode
has unlimited capacity. The generic network topology is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 Closed-loop supply chain network structure
We will first derive consumers’ expected demand and returns based on the firm’s return policy,
consumer valuations and the probability of receiving an unsatisfactory product. The return policy here
is defined as the amount of refund provided to a consumer if he/she returns the product. We assume that
the return policy will be fixed over the multi-period horizon, and there are no changes in the structure
and capacities of the facilities after the first period. We initially formulate the problem without carbon
emission costs as a mixed-integer quadratic program. We then extend this basic model to incorporate the
uncertainty of carbon cost arising from either a tax or a cap-and-trade system. The following notations
will be used throughout this paper.
Sets and Indices
E set of potential factories for manufacturing new and recovering used products, e ∈ E
W set of potential warehouses for new product distribution, w ∈ W
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L set of potential collection centers for returned products, l ∈ L
K set of retailer locations, k ∈ K
M set of transportation modes, m ∈M
T set of time periods, t ∈ T , n = |T |
A set of all the arcs in the network A ≡ {i j : (i ∈ E , j ∈ W ) or (i ∈ W , j ∈ K ) or (i ∈ K , j ∈
L ) or (i ∈ L , j ∈ E )}
F set of potential facilities,F = E ∪W ∪L
N set of all the nodes in the network,N = F ∪K
General Parameters
v salvage value for the returned product ($/unit)
p sale price of the new product ($/unit)
βi j the distance from node i to node j (km)
τme carbon emission factor for transportation mode m, m ∈M (ton/unit-km)
τp the production emission intensity (ton/unit)
Cost Parameters
τmc transportation cost factor for mode m, m ∈M ($/unit-km)
cmi j unit transportation cost from node i to node j using transportation mode m, c
m
i j = τ
m
c βi j, i j ∈
A ,m ∈M ($/unit)
fi fixed investment cost for building facility, i ∈ F ($)
K0 cost per unit of capacity ($/unit)
g unit production cost ($/unit)
αt carbon cost in period t, t ∈ T ($/unit)
Consumer Profile Parameters
µkt total population of potential consumers in location k at period t, k ∈ K , t ∈ T
φk probability of “ peach ” product
sk discounted value value of “lemon” product relative to value of “peach” product
Random Variables
Θ consumer’s valuation of the product, uniformly distributed on [0,1]
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Ik product acceptability, Ik =

1 with probability φk (“peach”)
0 with probability 1 − φk (“lemon”)
Decision Variables
xmi jt the amount of product transported from node i to node j using transportation mode m in period
t, i j ∈ A ,m ∈M , t ∈ T
yi = 1 if facility i is built, 0 otherwise, i ∈ F
Λi capacity of facility i, i ∈ F (units/period)
r the amount of refund for a returned product ($/unit)
4.3.1 Consumer Demand and Return behavior
Do not buy
 Buy product
Peach (       )
pΘ −
Lemon (1-    )
Decision 
Node
Chance  
Node
Keep
r p−
Return
k
s pΘ −
Seller chooses r
0
kφ
kφ
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l
kΘ ≥ θ
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kΘ θ<
k
r
s
Θ ≥
k
r
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Figure 4.2 Sequence of events for individual consumers
In this paper, we formulate consumer demand and return behavior as follows. The firm decides
on the refund for the product at the beginning of the study horizon. Then in each period, potential
consumers at each location enter the market and decide whether to purchase the product based on
maximizing their own surplus according to their realization of the valuation random variable, Θ. A
binary random variable Ik represents whether the product turns out to be a good match (“peach”) or bad
match (“lemon”) to the consumers’ expectations. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Each consumer is interested in consuming at most one unit of the product and consumer valuations of
the product Θ are uniformly distributed on [0,1]. The price for the product is p, which is exogenously
determined. A consumer with valuation θ decides whether to return the product or not after receiving
and trying it. If it is a peach, they will keep it and obtain utility θ − p. If the product is a lemon, and the
consumer keeps the it, they will obtain utility skθ − p, where sk < 1,∀k ∈ K . If they decide to return
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the product, they will obtain utility r − p, where the r is the refund provided by the firm. Assuming Ik
and Θ are independent, the utility a consumer at location k will derive from purchasing the product can
be stated as follows:
Uk(r; Θ, Ik) =

Θ − p, if Ik = 1
−p + max[skΘ, r], if Ik = 0
∀k ∈ K (4.1)
The expected utility for consumers at location k before purchasing the product can be stated as
follows:
Uˆbk (r; Θ)k = φk(Θ − p) + (1 − φk) (−p + max[skΘ, r]) ,∀k ∈ K (4.2)
Consumers with valuation equal to θˆk = rsk will be indifferent between returning or keeping the
lemon products. Consumers with valuation higher than θˆk will keep the lemon products while con-
sumers with valuation lower than θˆk will return them. Thus, Uˆbk (r; Θ) can be further stated as follows:
Uˆbk (r; Θ) =

φk(Θ − p) + (1 − φk)(skΘ − p),Θ ≥ θˆk
φk(Θ − p) + (1 − φk)(r − p),Θ < θˆk
(4.3)
A consumer with Θ = θ buys and keeps the lemon product if φk(θ − p) + (1 − φk)(skθ − p) ≥ 0 and
θ ≥ θˆk. By simplifying the first inequality, a consumer with valuation greater than max[θˆk, pφk+(1−φk)sk ]
will buy and keep the lemon products.
Similarly, the consumer will buy and then return the lemon products only when φk(θ − p) + (1 −
φk)(r − p) ≥ 0 and θ < θˆk. By simplifying the first inequality, consumers with valuation between
θlk =
p−(1−φk)r
φk
and θˆk will buy the product and return lemons.
To ensure the possibility of product returns, we assume that the firm sets r so that θlk ≤ θˆ; thus,
r ≥ pskφk+sk(1−φk) ,∀k ∈ K . This also implies that
p
φk+sk(1−φk) ≤ θˆk, so that a consumer with valuation
θ ≥ θˆk will buy and keep the lemon product. Thus, there will be only three types of consumers in the
market: (1) consumers with valuation θ ≤ θlk will not buy any products; (2) consumers with valuation
θlk ≤ θ ≤ θˆk will buy and return the product if it is a lemon; (3) consumers with valuation θ ≥ θˆk will
buy and keep the product, whether it is lemon or not. We also constraint r ≤ sk,∀k which implies that
θˆk ≤ 1. Two extreme cases will be: (1) θlk = θˆk, where all the consumers who receive lemons keep them;
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(2) θˆk = 1, where all lemons are returned. The larger the r, the more lenient the return policy is. Also,
we should note that θlk ≥ 0 is implied by r ≤ p and 0 ≤ φk ≤ 1.
Therefore, the expected demands of consumers at location k in period t can be computed as follows:
Dkt(r) = (1 − θlk)µkt =
(
1 − p
φk
+
(1 − φk)r
φk
)
µkt,∀k ∈ K , t ∈ T . (4.4)
The expected amount of returns from location k in period t is:
Rkt(r) = (1 − φk)(θˆk − θlk)µkt = (1 − φk)
(
(φk + sk(1 − φk))r
φksk
− p
φk
)
µkt,∀k ∈ K , t ∈ T . (4.5)
4.3.2 Basic Model Formulation
The mixed-integer quadratic programming model without carbon cost can be formulated as follows:
Basic model: max
x,y,r,Λ
(p − g) ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Dkt(r) + (v − r) ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Rkt(r)
− ∑
i∈F
( fiyi + C0Λi) − ∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
cmi jx
m
i jt (4.6)
s.t.
∑
w∈W
∑
m∈M
xmwkt − Dkt(r) = 0,∀k ∈ K ,∀t ∈ T (4.7)∑
l∈L
∑
m∈M
xmklt − Rkt(r) = 0,∀k ∈ K ,∀t ∈ T (4.8)∑
i∈N
∑
m∈M
xmi jt −
∑
j∈N
∑
m∈M
xmjit = 0,∀ j ∈ W ∪L ,∀t ∈ T (4.9)∑
j∈N
∑
m∈M
xmi jt − Byi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ E ,∀t ∈ T (4.10)∑
j∈N
∑
m∈M
xmi jt − Λi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ E ,∀t ∈ T (4.11)
r ≥ pskφk+sk(1−φk) ,∀k ∈ K (4.12)
r ≤ sk,∀k ∈ K (4.13)
y ∈ {0, 1}|F |, x ∈ R|A |×|M |+ (4.14)
The objective is to maximize the long-run profit after subtracting the total cost of current investment
as well as expected future production and operating costs. The first term in the objective function is the
revenue from selling new products while the second term is the loss from consumer returns. Constraints
(4.7) and (4.8) ensure that expected customer demands are met and returned products are collected.
Constraints (4.9) ensure that the warehouse and collection centers will not accumulate stocks. Con-
straints (4.10) enforce capacity limits of the processing nodes, where B is a sufficiently large number.
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The capacity constraint (4.11) requires that the total quantity of all products flowing from a processing
node i is smaller than the capacity Λi of facility i if it is built (yi = 1). If facility i is not built (yi = 0)
the constraint will force all flow variables xmi jt = 0 for all j ∈ N , t ∈ T . Constraints (4.12) and (4.13)
are equivalent to θlk ≤ θˆk and θˆk ≤ 1, respectively.
4.3.3 Carbon Cost Model
We will consider the carbon emissions from production as well as transportation. The total carbon
emissions Γt (ton) from transportation and production in period t can be computed as:
Γt(x) =
∑
i j∈A
βi j
∑
m∈M
τmxmi jt + τp
∑
i∈E
∑
j∈W
∑
m∈M
xmi jt,∀t ∈ T (4.15)
Assume the firm has to pay αt for each ton of carbon emitted in period t. Then the basic model can
be extended to incorporate the resulting carbon cost, which is stated as follows.
Carbon cost model: max
x,y,r,Λ
(p − g) ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Dkt(r) + (v − r) ∑
k∈K
∑
t∈T
Rkt(r) − ∑
i∈F
fiyi
− ∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
cmi jx
m
i jt −
∑
t∈T
αtΓt(x) (4.16)
subject to constraints (4.7) – (4.15).
The essence of the market mechanisms for regulating the carbon emissions is to put a price on
emission. This model can accommodate certain features of proposed market mechanisms of carbon
emission regulation. For a carbon tax regime, the αt could represent the carbon tax imposed by the
regulatory party. For a carbon cap-and-trade system, Gao and Ryan (2011b) demonstrate that the model
is also applicable to the firm who only sells and buys the permits (i.e., no banking of permits is involved)
to maintain the firm’s actual emissions below the imposed cap.
4.3.4 Carbon Cost Model under Ellipsoidal Uncertainty Set
The objective function (4.16) is actually a concave quadratic function of r, as seen below:
max r
(
(p − g) ∑
k,t
(1−φk)µkt
φk
+ v
∑
k,t
(1 − φk) (φk+sk(1−φk))µktφk sk
)
+r
(
p
∑
k,t
(1 − φk)µktφk
)
+ (p − g) ∑
k,t
(1 − pφk )µkt − v
∑
k,t
(1 − φk) pµktφk
−r2 ∑
k,t
(1 − φk) (φk+sk(1−φk))µktφk sk −
∑
i∈F
fiyi − ∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
i j∈A
xmi jt −
∑
t∈T
(αtΓt(x)) (4.17)
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For the sake of simplicity, we introduce constants ∆,Ω and Φ where:
∆ =
∑
k,t
(φk+sk(1−φk))µkt
φk sk
(1 − φk) (4.18)
Ω = (p − g) ∑
k,t
(1−φk)µkt
φk
+ v
∑
k,t
(1 − φk) (φk+sk(1−φk))µktφk sk + p
∑
k,t
(1 − φk)µktφk (4.19)
Φ = (p − g) ∑
k,t
(1 − pφk )µkt − v
∑
k,t
(1 − φk) pµktφk (4.20)
We introduce another variable z to represent objective function (4.16). The carbon cost model can be
stated as follows.
max
x,y,r,Λ
z (4.21)
s.t. αT Γ(x) ≤ −z − ∆r2 + Ωr − f T y −C0Λ − cT x + Φ,∀α ∈ U (4.22)
along with constraints (4.7) – (4.15). The vectors α, f , and c correspond to carbon costs, fixed opening
costs and transportation costs, respectively. Also, the vector y represents all binary decision variables,
and the vector x represents all flow variables. Γ(x) represents the vector of carbon emissions in each
period.
The parameter α is highly uncertain. We assume that the only carbon cost data available to the
decision maker are: (1) the nominal values α¯t; and (2) the possible deviations δt where δt < α¯t. This
means that αt may vary within the range [α¯t ± δt]. Define X as a set of (x, y, r,Λ) that satisfy constraints
(4.7) – (4.15). As the carbon cost parameter α is uncertain, the decision maker might be interested in a
set of solutions X() ∈ X that satisfies the constraint (4.22) with probability at least 1− . We can define
the set X() by using the following chance constraint.
X() = {(x, y, r,Λ) ∈ X : Pr[αT Γ(x) ≤ −z − ∆r2 + Ωr − f T y −C0Λ − cT x + Φ] ≥ 1 − } (4.23)
Instead of solving in terms of the chance constraint directly, robust optimization presents a different
approach. Given a set of solutions X, we define an uncertainty set Uρ and a set of robust feasible
solutions as follows.
Xr(ρ) = {(x, y, r,Λ) ∈ X : αT Γ(x) ≤ −z − ∆r2 + Ωr − f T y −C0Λ − cT x + Φ,∀α ∈ Uρ} (4.24)
The parameter ρ, referred to as the budget of uncertainty, controls the size of the uncertainty set Uρ.
The key point of robust optimization is designing Uρ such that Xr(ρ) ⊆ X(). The first requirement for
74
the resulting uncertainty set is to preserve the computational tractability. Moreover, the choice of the
parameter ρ should not be too conservative; i.e., we want to find the minimum value of ρ such that the
robust solution satisfies the chance constraint (4.23). One way to design such an uncertainty set is to
use an ellipsoid:
Uellips = {α ∈ Rn :
n∑
t=1
δ−2t (αt − α¯t)2 ≤ ρ2} (4.25)
where ρ controls the size of the ellipsoidal set. Applying the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality as in Gao and
Ryan (2011b), the equivalent robust counterpart of the above problem can be stated as follows:
Robust carbon cost model: max
z,y,x,Λ
z (4.26)
s.t. α¯T Γ(x) + ρ
√
n∑
t=1
(δtΓt(x))2 ≤ −z − ∆r2 + Ωr − f T y −C0Λ − cT x + Φ (4.27)
along with constraints (4.7) – (4.15).
The value of ρ depends on the decision maker’s conservatism. As shown in Gao and Ryan (2011b),
when ρ = 2.686 and n = 6, a feasible solution to constraint (4.27) satisfies constraint (4.23) with 99%
feasibility ( = 0.01). If ρ = 0, we have the nominal carbon cost model, which can be formulated as
follows.
Nominal carbon cost model: max
r,y,x,Λ
−∆r2 + Ωr + Φ − f T y −C0Λ − cT x − α¯T Γ(x) (4.28)
subject to constraints (4.7) – (4.15).
The major computational difficulty lies in dealing with constraint (4.27), which has both the l2-norm
of the decision variable vector and a quadratic term in r. The available solvers for Second-Order Cone
Problems (SOCP) require the right-hand side of constraint (4.27) to be linear. In this paper, we will
use a piecewise linear function to approximate the quadratic function Q(r) ≡ −∆r2 + Ωr + Φ. Before
we proceed to the piecewise linear approximation, we conjecture that the optimal refunds for the three
models have the following relationship.
Conjecture 1. Under the same settings for cost, revenue and consumer profile parameters, the optimal
refund of the basic model, nominal data model and robust optimization model r∗B, r
∗
N and r
∗
R satisfy:
r∗B ≥ r∗N ≥ r∗R.
This is matched by the following observations. The objective function of the basic model is
max
r,x,y,Λ
Z(x, y, r,Λ), where Z(x, y, r,Λ) = −∆r2 + Ωr + Φ − f T y − C0Λ − cT x. The objective function
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of the nominal data model is max
r,x,y,Λ
Z(x, y, r,Λ) − α¯T Γ(x). The objective function of the RO model is
max
r,x,y,Λ
Z(x, y, r,Λ)− α¯T Γ(x)−ρ
√
n∑
t=1
(δtΓt(x))2. The expected demand and returns function are increasing
in r. Thus, if a “no return” policy is optimal for the basic model, then providing a generous refund
in the nominal and RO model will not increase the profit but incur an additional cost. Thus, the ‘no
return” policy will be optimal for the nominal data model and robust optimization model. Likewise,
if a “no return” policy is optimal for the nominal data model, then it should be optimal for the robust
optimization model. This conjecture is also supported by the results of the computational experiments
shown in section 4.4.
Conjecture 1 suggests possible unintended side effect of carbon emission regulation. Introducing
regulation to limit carbon emissions will reduce the firm’s willingness to provide as high a level of
product refund as it does when no carbon regulation is implemented. Potentially, it might result in less
recycling/remanufacturing and more landfilling of products that do not meet consumers’ expectations.
Moreover, uncertainties in the carbon regulations exacerbate this effect.
4.3.5 Piecewise Linear Approximation for the Second Order Cone Constraint
Define Lr = max∀k∈K
( pskφk+sk ) and Ur = min∀k∈K
(sk). The concave function Q(r) is approximated by first
introducing a number N of sampling coordinates r1, ..., rN with r1 = Lr and rN = Ur. The function
is then approximated by an N − 1 segment continuous piecewise linear function hi(r) defined over the
range [ri, ri+1], i = 1, ..,N−1, where Q(r) ≈
N−1∑
i=1
hi(r) (see Figure 4.3). For any r with ri ≤ r ≤ ri+1, hi(r)
can be defined by the convex combination of g(ri) and g(ri+1). Let λ ∈ [0, 1] and r = λri + (1 − λ)ri+1.
The hi(r) can be evaluated by :
hi(r) =

λg(ri) + (1 − λ)g(ri+1), for ri ≤ r ≤ ri+1
0, otherwise
(4.29)
where λ =
ri+1 − r
ri+1 − ri . To obtain a tractable form of hi(r), we introduce a binary variable bi associated
with the ith interval where bi = 1 if ri ≤ r ≤ ri+1 and bi = 0 otherwise (i = 1, ...,N), with b0 = bN = 0.
We also introduce another continuous variable ai for each coordinate where ai ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, ...,N.
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Then the hi(r) can be evaluated by following constraints:
N−1∑
i=1
bi = 1 (4.30)
ai ≤ bi−1 + bi, i = 1, ...,N (4.31)
N∑
i=1
ai = 1 (4.32)
r =
N∑
i=1
airi (4.33)
hi(r) =
N∑
i=1
aig(ri) (4.34)
0 ≤ ai ≤ 1, bi = 0 or 1, i = 1, ..., n (4.35)
By replacing Q(r) with
N−1∑
i=0
hi(r) and appending constraints (4.30) - (4.35) to the other constraints
in the robust model, we obtain a tractable robust counterpart of the problem.
Figure 4.3 Piecewise linear approximations for Q(r)
4.4 Numerical Study
The purpose of this numerical study is threefold: first, to test the effectiveness of the piecewise linear
function approximation method; second, to investigate how solutions provided by the basic model, the
nominal data model and the RO model differ in the network topology, the refund provided and the
profit; and third, to study the impact of parameters on solutions provided by the RO model. Before the
presentation of results, we describe the details of the experiments.
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4.4.1 Description of Base-case
For the base-case, there are 25 retail stores in the network. We consider 8, 10 and 6 potential
locations for factories, warehouses and collection centers, respectively. Locations for retail stores and
candidate facilities are randomly generated in a 5000×5000 kilometer square. There are 6 time periods.
We use the cost, revenue and consumer profile parameters summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The fixed
opening costs are based on data from Fleischmann et al. (2001) and Salema et al. (2007). The carbon
emission factors are based on data from Pirog et al. (2001) and the cost factor is based on the data from
Byrne et al. (2006). We let α¯t = $0.15 and δt = $0.05 (∀t), which are based on the data from Benz and
Tru¨ck (2009). As consumer valuation is normalized between 0 and 1, the values for other parameters
are normalized as well. The production emission intensity τp = 0.0001 (ton/unit). We set ρ = 1.564 for
the ellipsoidal uncertainty set (0.8 feasibility guarantee). The basic model, the nominal data model and
the RO model are then solved by the GAMS CPLEX MIQCP solver. All the experiments were solved
by a PC with an Intel Core Quad 3.00 GHz processor. For each model, the optimal solution of one
instance can be obtained within 30 seconds. Thus, computation time is not an issue.
Table 4.1 Parameter values in the base-case
Parameter Value
v, p, g,C0($) 0.6, 0.8, 0.3, 0.01
fp, fw, fc($) 37500, 4500, 2250
µkt 15000 (∀k, t)
φk, sk 0.8, 0.7 (∀k)
Table 4.2 Emission and cost factors of transportation modes in the base-case
Transport Mode CO2 Emissions Factor (τme ) Cost (τ
m
c )
(ton/unit-km) ($/unit-km)
H 0.60×10−6 1.50×10−4
M 1.20×10−6 1.13×10−4
L 2.40×10−6 3.75×10−5
78
4.4.2 Effectiveness of the Piecewise Linear Function Approximation
We assume for the piecewise linear function all segments have an equal width. The number of
segments N − 1 depends on the desired approximation error η, where η can be stated as follows:
η = max{ max
ri≤r≤ri+1
| hi(r) − Q(r) |} (4.36)
Based on theorem 2 in Frenzen et al. (2010), the number of segments needed for the approximation
error η can be estimated by:
N ∼ (Ur − Lr)
√
2∆
4
√
η
+ 1 (4.37)
We calculate the maximum N needed for all parametric experiments. As ∆ > 0 implies Q(r)
is a concave function, the minimum value of Q(r) will be the value at either Ur or Lr. Given the
approximation error η = 10, which is 0.000612% of the minimum value of Q(r) under the base-case,
56 sampling coordinates will be needed. We also compare the results with approximation error η = 4
with 88 sampling coordinates. To do so, 30 random location profiles are generated. We use NF , NW ,
NC , respectively, to denote the average numbers of factories, warehouses and collection centers opened
and Λ¯F , Λ¯W , Λ¯C , respectively (in units of 1000 ), to denote the average capacities. The symbols of #FW
and #WR represent the average number of arcs per factory with positive flow between the factory and the
warehouse, and the average number of arcs per warehouse with positive flow between the warehouse
and the retail store, respectively. We use #RCF to represent the average number of arcs per collection
center with positive flow between either the collection center and a retail store or the collection center
and a factory. The values of #FW and #RCF are computed as follows, with #WR calculated in a similar
manner as #FW .
#FW =
∑
i∈E
∑
j∈W
∑
m∈M
1[ ∑
t∈T
xmi jt>0]∑
i∈E
yi
#RCF =
∑
i∈K
∑
j∈L
∑
m∈M
1[ ∑
t∈T
xmi jt>0] +
∑
i∈L
∑
j∈E
∑
m∈M
1[ ∑
t∈T
xmi jt>0]∑
i∈L
yi
We also calculate the average profit (Π∗, in $1000) and the average optimal refund (r∗) for the
solutions provided by three different models. The 95% confidence interval for the two different ap-
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proximation errors are reported in Table 4.3. Because the results were nearly identical, 56 sampling
coordinates were used for all the computational experiments.
Table 4.3 95% confidence intervals of results for the robust carbon cost model under different approximation
errors
N NF NW NC Λ¯F Λ¯W Λ¯C #FW #WR #RCF r∗ Π∗
88 2.73 4.03 1.40 226.50 153.00 9.90 1.54 6.70 6.16 0.62 1184.80
± 0.23 ± 0.36 ± 0.51 ± 27.33 ± 15.87 ± 3.67 ± 0.15 ± 0.71 ± 2.38 ± 0.01 ± 22.45
56 2.73 4.03 1.40 226.55 153.03 9.99 1.54 6.75 6.16 0.62 1184.80
± 0.23 ± 0.36 ± 0.51 ± 27.33 ± 15.86 ± 3.72 ± 0.15 ± 0.71 ± 2.38 ± 0.01 ± 22.45
4.4.3 Topology Comparison
In this section, we compare how the number of facilities opened, the average capacity of facilities,
and transportation links between nodes differ in the solutions provided by the three different models.
We report the 95% confidence intervals for the number of facilities, the capacities and the number of
arcs between facilities in Table 4.4 for the basic and nominal models. In addition, the utilization rate of
each transportation mode MRm is calculated. For example, the utilization rate of transportation mode L
can be computed as follows. MRM and MRH are defined in a similar way.
MRL =
∑
i j∈A
∑
t∈T
1[xLi jt>0]∑
i j∈A
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
1[xmi jt>0]
Figure 4.4 shows potential locations of one instance. Solutions of different models for this instance
are presented in Figures 4.5 to 4.7. In the figure, an arc indicates that in at least one period products are
shipped between two nodes. The forward flow is represented by a solid line while the reverse flow is
represented by a dashed line. For the base-case, solutions provided by the nominal data model and the
basic model are very similar, and they have the nearly same network configuration for all 30 instances.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 present one instance that has the same configurations. This is because the carbon
cost accounts for a small portion of the total costs. The only differences are in the total profit, which
decreases by 3417.92 ± 118.28.
By making paired comparisons with the basic model and calculating the confidence interval, results
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obtained via the RO model open more facilities for the forward flow but fewer facilities for the reverse
flow. Compared to Table 4.3 with N = 56, the average number of factories opened increases by 0.43 ±
0.24 in the robust model. The average number of warehouses opened increases by 0.9 ± 0.43, but the
average number of collection centers opened decreases by 0.97 ± 0.50. The average facility capacities
is smaller and the total profit is lower under the RO model. The average capacities of the factories,
warehouses and collection centers decrease by 86.53 ± 37.18, 80.41 ± 24.87 and 50.70 ± 7.20 thousand
units, respectively. The total profit decreases by 16.94% comparing to the basic model. Under the RO
model, the firm wants to reduce the carbon cost. Because the carbon emissions are proportional to the
distance traveled and the quantities of demands and return, the total carbon emissions will be reduced
by building more facilities and providing a lower refund (which also results in smaller capacities).
Transportation mode L is favored almost exclusively (100% for the basic and the nominal data
model and 98.88% for the RO model) because of its lowest cost. This is also a common occurrence
in most of the following experiments; thus, we only report the transportation utilization rate when the
pattern is significantly different.
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Figure 4.4 Potential locations of facilities
4.4.4 The Parametric Experiments
The computational experiments are extended to provide a better understanding of the solutions
found by the robust optimization model. In this section, we explore how changes in the parameters can
affect the optimal refund offered, profit and network topology. As our experiments involve solving a
81
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
km
km
Figure 4.5 Network configuration of the solution of the basic model
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Figure 4.6 Network configuration of the solution of the nominal data model
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Figure 4.7 Network configuration of the solution of the RO model
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Table 4.4 95% confidence intervals of results for the base-case from the basic and nominal models
Model NF NW NC Λ¯F Λ¯W Λ¯C #FW #WR #RCF r∗ Π∗
Basic 2.30 3.13 2.37 313.03 233.40 60.60 1.39 8.89 12.60 0.70 1426.50
± 0.23 ± 0.41 ± 0.24 ± 38.88 ± 26.61 ± 7.93 ± 0.18 ± 1.01 ± 1.51 ± 0.00 ± 11.67
Nominal 2.30 3.13 2.37 313.00 231.56 60.56 1.39 8.83 12.60 0.70 1423.10
± 0.23 ± 0.41 ± 0.24 ± 38.85 ± 26.99 ± 7.93 ± 0.18 ± 1.03 ± 1.51 ± 0.00 ± 11.77
MIQCP model with many parameters, a full factorial experiment would involve an unrealistic number
of cases. Thus, we design parametric experiments in which the RO model is solved for three parameter
levels (low, medium and high) for each generated location profile. For each location profile, we also
make paired comparisons and use ∆ML to denote the difference between the solutions from the low to
the medium parameter levels, and ∆HM to denote the difference between the solutions from the medium
to the high parameter levels. The 95% confidence intervals for ∆ML and ∆HM are summarized in Table
4.5.
Experiment 1: impact of transportation emission factors. For the low level, we reduce the
transportation emission factors for the three modes by 25% from the base case (medium) level and
increase them by 25% for the high level. As a generous refund will create more demand and returns for
the product, more carbon will be emitted from the transportation and the production. Therefore, smaller
refunds will be provided as the emission factor level increases, and the firm tends to discourage both
demand and returns to reduce the carbon cost. Shrinkage in demand and returns also leads to smaller
average capacities for all the facilities, fewer collection centers and the lower profit. But the number
of factories opened increases from the low to medium level and the number of warehouses opened
increases from the medium to high level. Under the high emission factor level, mode L accounts for
95.31% of the total transportation modes. The portion of shipments by transportation mode L slightly
decreases due to its high carbon emission rate.
Experiment 2: impact of transportation cost factors. For the low level, we reduce the transporta-
tion cost factors for the three modes by 25% from the base case (medium) level and increase them by
25% for the high level. A lower refund will be provided to discourage both demand and returns as the
transportation cost factors increases. The reason is quite intuitive, as the transportation cost are pro-
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portional to the quantity of products and the distance traveled. Thus, under the high transportation cost
factor, the optimal solution will discourage returns and fewer collection centers with smaller average
capacities are opened. The average capacities of the factories decrease from the low to medium level,
and the average capacities of the warehouses decrease from the medium to high level.
Experiment 3: impact of fixed opening costs. For the low level, we reduce the fixed opening
costs for the three facilities by 25% from the base case (medium) level and increase them by 25% for
the high level. We find that the increase in the fixed opening costs has no impact on the optimal refund.
Moreover, as fixed opening costs increase, fewer facilities will be opened, and the average capacities of
the factories and the warehouses increase. The total profit decreases as the fixed opening costs increase.
Experiment 4: impact of the probability of receiving the peach product. For the low level, we
reduce the the probability of receiving the peach product (∀k ∈ K ) by 0.1 from the base case (medium)
level and increase it by 0.1 for the high level. When φk is low, the product is less “attractive”. So
providing a large amount of refund will be favorable. As φk increases, consumers are more likely to get
a “peach” product and are less likely to return the product, which results in a higher profit and lower
refund. At the same time, more warehouses are opened to handle the forward flow, and more factories
are opened as the probability of receiving the peach product increases from the medium to the high
level. The average capacities for the factories and warehouses also increase as the probability increases.
The average capacity of the collection centers decreases from the low to medium level.
Experiment 5: impact of the salvage value. For the low level, we reduce the salvage value of the
lemon product by 0.1 from the base case (medium) level and increase it by 0.1 for the high level. As the
salvage value of the returned product increases, it is more favorable for the firm to receive a returned
product. Thus, the amount of the optimal refund will be larger and the profit will be higher. Meanwhile,
the average capacity, and the number of collection centers opened will increase to handle the surge in
the reverse flow. The average capacities of the factories also increase.
Experiment 6: impact of the discounted value. For the low level, we reduce the discounted value
(∀k ∈ K ) by 0.1 from the base case (medium) level and increase them by 0.1 for the high level. As
the discounted value increases, the total profit and the optimal refund increase. In addition, consumers
are less likely to return the product, which results in fewer collection centers with smaller average
capacities. The lower the valuation for the “lemon” product, the less likely it is that the consumer will
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purchase the products. When sk = 0.6, a full refund will be provided to increase the demand. Thus,
more factories and warehouses are opened under the low sk level.
Experiment 7: impact of the consumer population. For the low level, we reduce the consumer
population for all locations and all periods (∀k ∈ K ,∀t ∈ T ) by 25% from the base case (medium)
level and increase it by 25% for the high level. As the consumer population increases, the amounts
of demand and returns also increase. As a result, more facilities for the forward flow will be opened,
and the average facilities capacity as well as the total profit will increase. But a lower refund will be
provided to reduce the potential loss from the returns. As a result, fewer collection centers will be
utilized and their average capacities decrease.
Experiment 8: impact of the production cost. For the low level, we reduce the production cost by
0.1 from the base case (medium) level and increase it by 0.1 for the high level. As the production cost
increases, the unit revenue from selling and the total profit both decrease. Thus, a lower refund will be
provided to prevent excessive loss from consumer returns. At the same time, fewer collection centers
will be utilized and the average capacities for the collection centers will decrease as the production cost
increases. The average capacities of factories decrease from the medium to high level.
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4.4.4.1 Summary of Parametric Experiment Results
Parameters vary in their impacts on the network topology, the refund provided and the profit. The
impact of parameters on the RO model is summarized in Table 4.6. We use the signs + and – to
represent significant increase and decrease in the value of both ∆ML and ∆HM, in response to a increase
of the corresponding parameter respectively. The sign ± indicates that there is no significant increase or
decrease in both. We obtain several interesting observations. First, transportation emission factors are
the only parameter that will affect the utilization rate of transportation modes. If the policy maker wants
to change the utilization pattern of transportation modes under the incoming carbon emission regulation,
it might achieve this goal only if the emission factor of current transportation modes is sufficiently high.
Second, consumer population is the only factor that has significant impacts on the network topology,
the refund provided and the profit. Surprisingly, the firm will provide a less generous refund as the
overall consumer population increases. Third, lowering cost is always a wise way to improve profit,
but improving product quality, represented by the portion of “peach” products, and the attractiveness as
well as the salvage value of the “lemon” products can also help to improve the overall profit. Finally,
some parameters have opposite effects on the forward and reverse channel of the CLSC. For example,
a larger consumer population will result in fewer collection centers with small average capacities. But
at the same time, more forward facilities are opened, and their average capacities are larger.
Table 4.6 Parameter impact on the RO model
Parameter NF NW NC Λ¯F Λ¯W Λ¯C r∗ Π∗
Transportation carbon emission factor ± ± – – – – – –
Transportation cost factor ± ± – ± ± – – –
Fixed opening cost – – – + + ± ± –
Probability of peach products ± ± ± ± ± ± – +
Salvage value of returned products ± ± + + ± + + +
Consumer discounted valuation ± ± – ± ± – + +
Consumer population + + – + + – – +
Production cost ± ± – ± ± – – –
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4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an integrated model for product return management and CLSC network
design problem considering uncertain carbon cost. This integrated model has the potential to benefit the
manufacturer who has control over the return process or owns the retailer stores. The proposed model
can accommodate several features of practical relevance. For example, consumers have demand for new
products and some of the unsatisfactory products will be returned, where both consumers’ purchasing
and return behavior will be affected by the refund offered. Meanwhile, the firm must design the network
for distributing the new products and collecting the returned products. The decisions regarding the
location of the factory, warehouse and collection center, capacity of each facility and flow routing
through the network must be made within a multi-period framework.
In addition, the explicit consideration of carbon cost within the network design is crucial under
the emergence of emission trading or carbon tax schemes. The proposed model also accommodates
this feature by considering uncertainty in carbon cost. Utilizing the robust optimization approach to
characterize such uncertainty, a model with both the l2-norm of the decision variable vector and a
quadratic term is derived. We then propose a piecewise linear function approximation method to solve
the model. Computational results illustrate the trade-offs in revenues, transportation cost and carbon
cost in designing the network and the return policy. Different parameters vary in their impact on the
refund provided, the profit and the network topology. For policy implications, we find that uncertainty
in carbon regulation has the effect of reducing the optimal refund and thus, results in fewer returns.
This might not benefit the environment as the products might go to landfill instead of being recycled or
reused.
An important extension to the setting considered in this paper would be to include the price of the
product as a decision variable. The pricing and refund decisions are naturally related in many practical
planning decisions, as the decision maker has to balance the trade-offs in revenue and costs when the
pricing decision is taken into consideration. However, the inclusion of price as a decision variable in the
robust optimization framework will generate significant computational difficulties, as an approximation
algorithm for a two-dimensional surface will be needed. Nevertheless, this is certainly an interesting and
challenging research direction. In this paper, we also assume that the price and/or the refund is fixed,
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it might be worthwhile to relax this assumption and allow the price and/or the refund to be changed
with the study horizon. A second way to extend the current research is to consider alternative structures
for the network. An integrated warehouse/collection center model might worth investigating. This is
also a feature that exists in many practical reverse logistics planning contexts. It might be interesting
to see how this integrated structure combined with uncertainty in carbon regulation would influence
the network design. In this paper, only the expected value of demand and returns are used in the
optimization model. An interesting way to extend this setting is to construct scenarios to approximate
their distributions and formulate a stochastic program for the basic model. It is also interesting to
study the expected demand and returns under other distributions for Θ. In addition, we consider carbon
emission only from transportation and production in this paper, and it might be worthwhile to consider
the carbon emissions from building and operating facilities as well.
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSION
The unifying theme of this dissertation is to provide insights in understanding product return man-
agement and CLSC network design in a comprehensive manner. It utilizes both empirical and quan-
titative study, and adopts both stochastic programming and robust optimization to handle the different
types of uncertainties in the model. The managerial results derived from this dissertation will benefit
different firms to gain a deeper understanding in product return management, CLSC network design
under carbon policy uncertainty or the integration issues of both.
In this dissertation, we start with product return management. We focus on the case when a seller
offers both new and refurbished products. Our empirical study indicates that there exist consumers who
will never consider purchasing refurbished products and consumers who will only consider purchas-
ing the refurbished version of a given model. But the majority of consumers will consider purchasing
both products and have uncertainty concerning their valuation of refurbished electronics. Those tacti-
cal consumers want enough cost savings to compensate for the valuation uncertainty and seek various
mechanisms to mitigate such unpredictability. We analyzed three different strategies for the seller and
explored the optimal price and restocking fees in a numerical study. Optimality conditions and numer-
ical analysis show that different combinations of price and restocking fees are favored under different
conditions. We also show that the combination of low price and strict return policy might be favored
under very special conditions. Moreover, parameters vary in their impacts on the variety decision and
restocking fee decision. We show that by protecting the consumer against a lemon product, allowing re-
turns enables the seller to serve the tactical consumers with refurbished products and charge a relatively
high price even when their expected valuation is low. In this way, both the seller and the consumer
benefit from allowing returns. The results also suggest that sellers should deliberately consider the
market segment conditions, consumer valuations, and cost factors to choose the appropriate price and
restocking fees for refurbished products.
90
Next, we study a closed-loop supply chain network design problem where the demands and returns
of products are stochastic variables. We consider two regulatory policies to cope with the uncertainty
in carbon emission regulations, and we propose a robust extension of a stochastic program. Further,
we develop tractable robust counterparts of the proposed hybrid model to find the robust solutions for
box and ellipsoidal uncertainty sets. In general, the optimal network configuration must balance the
trade-offs between investment, transportation and carbon emission costs if the carbon regulation is in-
corporated. More facilities will be opened and the total expected cost will increase as the uncertainty
level increases. Moreover, the share of transportation by the low-emitting modes will also increase as
the regulation policy uncertainty level increases. The problem formulation with nominal carbon prices
or tax rates provides an unrealistically optimistic estimation of the real problem while the worst case s-
cenario problem provides a conservative solution. The problem formulation with ellipsoidal uncertainty
set allows the decision maker to balance the trade-off between robustness and performance. In addition,
the proposed model can provide certain protection under the worst case scenario.
For the last part of this dissertation, we propose an integrated model for product return management
and CLSC network design considering uncertain carbon cost. The proposed model can accommodate
several features of practical relevance. For example, consumers have demand for new products and
some of the unsatisfactory products will be returned, where both consumers’ purchasing and return
behavior will be affected by the refund offered. Meanwhile, the firm must design the network for
distributing the new products and collecting the returned products. The decisions regarding the location
of the factories, warehouses and collection centers, capacities of each facility and flow routing through
the network must be made over multiple periods. We explicitly consider the uncertainty in the carbon
cost. Utilizing the robust optimization approach to characterize such uncertainty, a model with both the
l2-norm of the decision variable vector and a quadratic term is derived. We then propose a piecewise
linear function approximation method to solve the model. Computational results illustrate trade-offs in
revenues, transportation cost and carbon cost in designing the network and the return policy. Different
parameters vary their impact on the refund provided, the profit and the network topology. For policy
implications, we find that uncertainty in carbon regulation has the effect of reducing the refund and thus,
result in less returns. This might not benefit environment as the products might go to landfill instead of
being recycled and reused in the future.
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In conclusion, we believe that building a comprehensive framework for product return management
and CLSC network design is crucial under the emergence of emission trading or carbon tax schemes.
It opens many research directions. For the future work, it is important to incorporate the inventory and
routing issues into this framework. Thus, it would not only have the strategic decisions such as the
locations of the facilities, but it would also include operational decisions such as routine and inventory
policy. In addition, what other consumer behaviors the firm should take into consideration when facing
the design of the network is also worth investigating. Finally, the integration of robust optimization and
stochastic programming holds great promise as an optimization tool for practical problems. Stochastic
programming can take advantage of the probability distributions of the data which are known or can be
estimated. Robust optimization, on the other hand, is rather deterministic and set-based, which doesn’t
depend on the probabilistic description. Thus, when the optimization model has uncertainties that can
be described by probability distributions and other types of uncertainties that can be characterized by
certain uncertainty sets, the integration of the two approaches might worth consideration. Virtually any
optimization problem that involves two different types of uncertainties can be revisited by the judicious
combination of the two approaches.
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Netnography Quotations
Q1: “It is a 50/50, toss of the coin issue when it comes to buying refurbished anything. Sometimes
you make out OK, sometimes you don’t.” (http://forums.cnet.com/7723-10157_102-525329.
html)
Q2: “‘Refurbished’ is a crap shoot. Refurbished products come from a variety of sources. There may
have been nothing at all wrong with it. It may have an intermittent problem that does not immediately
make its presence known. It may have an overheating problem and work fine for a few minutes, then
completely quit working and is returned for that reason... After saying all this, in my experience, the
odds are with you in the long run. Not every device that you buy ‘refurbished’ will be a defective device.
You’re going to get several good ones for every bad one you get, but expect a bad one every now and
then.” (http://forums.cnet.com/7726-10157_102-5124344.html)
Q3: “Apple brings the products back to as-new specifications. They even replace the outer cases
on products like the iPods, so you don’t even have to worry about getting one with cosmetic damage.”
(http://forums.cnet.com/7723-10157_102-525329.html)
Q4: “Refurbished computers – I wouldn’t do it again.” (http://forums.cnet.com/7723-7586_
102-278416.html)
Q5: “I have always stayed away from refurbished products they weren’t as good.” (http://
forums.cnet.com/7723-7595_102-222574.html)
Q6: “I almost always buy refurbished rather than brand new.” (http://forums.cnet.com/
7726-10157_102-5124372.html)
Q7: “High-volume production lines typically omit 100% testing of all production items, opting
instead to bear the cost of a small percentage being returned to make them serviceable. Thus, such
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‘refurbished’ items are more thoroughly tested than a new off-the-shelf unit at a dealer, boding well for
buying such a unit... I’m a proponent of refurbished electronics and have great success with them while
saving money!” (http://forums.cnet.com/7726-10157_102-5124325.html)
Q8: “The camcorder (Canon Vixia HF200) is $749 new but the refurbished one is $399! Is the price
worth the camcorder being refurbished?” (http://forums.cnet.com/7723-7594_102-388858.
html)
Q9: “The key is making sure you’re comfortable with where you’re getting the item from and making
sure they have some kind of warranty (whether it’s exchange or return).” (http://forums.cnet.com/
7726-10157_102-5125014.html)
Q10: “I would not hesitate to buy a factory refurbished product, especially if I’m buying it from the
manufacturer.” (http://forums.cnet.com/7723-7595_102-304633.html)
Q11: “I think I’m going to buy a refurbished Macbook (Aluminium or Pro), but what is the return
policy? If I get it, and I’m not happy can I return it? What if it has a scratch or dead pixels? Can I
return it for a replacement?” (http://forums.macrumors.com/showthread.php?t=814600)
Q12: “I recently bought a refurbished 24” ACD and it had a big piece of dust between the glass
and the screen. It was very noticeable to me, so I returned it immediately for a full refund. I tried for
a second refurbished 24” ACD and it had a smaller piece of dust, but it also had a dead pixel (stuck
on red), so I returned it as well. I just couldn’t justify paying $599 for a display that wasn’t perfect.”
(http://forums.macrumors.com/archive/index.php/t-782725.html)
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Appendix A2
Strict Return Policy
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are:
∂Lˆ
∂pr
=
∂Πˆ
∂pr
− λˆ1 − λˆ2(1 − δ)φ + λˆ3 + λˆ4 = 0 (A.1)
∂Lˆ
∂ f
= (1 − δφ)λˆ2 − λˆ4 = 0 (A.2)
λˆ1((1 − δφ)pn − pr) = 0 (A.3)
λˆ2((1 − δφ) f − (1 − δ)φpr) = 0 (A.4)
λˆ3(pr − pn + δφ) = 0 (A.5)
λˆ4(pr − f ) = 0 (A.6)
λˆ1 ≥ 0 λˆ2 ≥ 0 λˆ3 ≥ 0 λˆ4 ≥ 0 and Constraints (??) – (3.3) hold (A.7)
Because f is not involved in the objective function, its value will not affect the result. Without loss
of optimality, then, we assume that constraint (3.2) holds as an equality; i.e., θˆl = θ¯. This implies λˆ4 = 0
and from equation (A.2), λˆ2 = 0. Note that this also implies f ≤ pr.
Table A.1 Critical Values in Strict Return Policy
Point T-cons. Buy Expression
A New pr(A) = (1 − δφ)pn
f (A) = (1 − δ)φpn
B Both pr(B) =
βRδφ(1−δφ)(1+cr)+βT (cr+(1−δφ)(2pn−(1−cn))
2βT +2δφ(1−δφ)βR
f (B) = δφ
2(1−δ)βR(1−δφ)(1+cr)−φ(1−δ)βT (cr+(1−δφ)(2pn−cn))
2(1−δφ)(βT +(1+βR)(1−δφ)−1)
C Refurb. pr(C) = pn − δφ
f (C) = (1−δ)φ(pn−δφ)1−δφ
Conditions under which points A, B and C are optimal under the strict return policy.
Point A is defined by λˆ3 = 0 and constraint (??) holds as an equality. Option A must satisfy
λˆ1(A) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
λˆ1(A) is determined by the following equation:
λˆ1(A) =
βT (cr − (1 − δφ)cn)
δφ(1 − δφ) + β
R (1 + cr − 2(1 − δφ)pn)
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Point B is defined by λˆ1 = λˆ3 = 0. The values of pr(B) and f (B) are shown in table A.1.
Point C is defined by λˆ1 = 0 and constraint (3.3) holds as an equality. Option C must satisfy
λˆ3(C) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
We can solve for λˆ3(C) as follows:
λˆ3(C) = −β
T (2δφ + cr − (1 − δφ)cn − 2δφpn)
δφ(1 − δφ) − β
R (1 + 2δφ + cr − 2pn)
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Appendix A3
Lenient Return Policy
The Hessian matrix for the profit function is positive definite. Thus, the function Π˘(pr, f ) is concave
and the following KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality.
∂L˘
∂pr
=
∂Π˘
∂pr
+ (1 − (1 − δ)φ)λ˘1 − (1 − δ)λ˘2 + (1 − δ)λ˘3 = 0 (A.8)
∂L˘
∂ f
=
∂Π˘
∂ f
− δφλ˘1 − δλ˘2 + δλ˘3 + λ˘4 = 0 (A.9)
λ˘1(1 − (1 − δ)φpr − δφ f − (1 − φ)pn) = 0 (A.10)
λ˘2((1 − δ)pn − δ f − (1 − δ)pr) = 0 (A.11)
λ˘3(δ f + (1 − δ)pr − pn + δ) = 0 (A.12)
λ˘4 f = 0 (A.13)
λ˘1 ≥ 0 λ˘2 ≥ 0 λ˘3 ≥ 0 λ˘4 ≥ 0 and Constraints (2.10) – (2.13) hold (A.14)
Table A.2 Critical Values under Lenient Return Policy
Point T-cons. Buy Expression
D Both pr(D) =
φ2δ(1−δ)βR(1+cr)+βT (φ(cr−(1−δ)cn)+2(1−δφ)pn−v(1−δφ)
2(βT +φ2δ(1−δ)βR)
f (D) = (1−δ)β
Rδφ((1−(1−δ)φ)(1+cr)−2(1−φ)pn)−βT ((1−(1−δ)φ)((1−δ)cn+δv−cr)−2δφ(1−δ)pn)
2δ(βT +φ2δ(1−δ)βR)
E Refurb. pr(E) = pn − δφ
f (E) = pn + (1 − δ)φ − 1
D′ Both Pr(D′) =
(1−φ)pn
1−(1−δ)φ
f (D′) = 0
F New pr(F) = 1+cr2
f (F) = (1−δ)(2pn−1−cr)2δ
G Both pr(G) = 1+cr2
f (G) = δ(cr−v)+(1−δ)(2pn−cn−1)2δ
H Refurb. pr(H) = 1+cr2
f (H) = 2pn−2+(1−δ)−(1−δ)cr2δ
I Refurb. pr(I) =
pn−δ)
(1−δ)
f (I) = 0
J Both pr(J) =
βRδ(1+cr)−βT ((1−δ)(2pn−cn)−vδ+cr)
2((1−δ)βT +βRδ)
f (J) = 0
K New pr(K) = pn
f (K) = 0
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Conditions under which points A and D (D′) through K are optimal under the lenient return policy.
Point A is defined by λ˘3 = 0 and λ˘4 = 0. Constraints (2.10) and (2.11) hold as equalities. Option A
must satisfy λ˘1(A) ≥ 0 and λ˘2(A) ≥ 0 to become optimal under strategy 2.
λ˘1(A) and λ˘2(A) are determined by the following equations.
λ˘1(A) = −βR (1 + cr − 2(1 − δφ)pn)
λ˘2(A) =
(1 − δ)βRδφ(1 − δ) (1 + cr − 2(1 − δφ)pn) + βT (cr − (1 − δ)cn − δv)
δ(1 − δ)
Point D is defined by λ˘2 = 0, λ˘3 = 0 and λ˘4 = 0 and constraint (2.10) holds as an equality. Option
D must satisfy λ˘1 ≥ 0 to become optimal.
Solving equations (A.8) and (A.9), we can obtain the expression for λ˘1(D) as follows.
λ˘1(D) = −β
RβT (1 + (1 − φ)cr + φ(δv + (1 − δ)cn) − 2pn(1 − δφ))
βRφ2δ(1 − δ) + βT
Point D′ is defined by λ˘2 = 0, λ˘3 = 0 and constraints (2.10) and (2.13) holds as an equality. Option
D′ must satisfy λ˘1 ≥ 0 and λ˘4 ≥ 0 to become optimal.
Solving equations (A.8) and (A.9), we can obtain the expression for λ˘1(D′) and λ˘4(D′) as follows,
where τ = 1 − φ + δφ.
λ˘1(D′) =
βT (δ − 1)τcn + τcr + βRδ (τ + 2pφ + τcr − 2pn) − δ (vτ − 2(1 − δ)φpn)
δτ2
λ˘4(D′) =
βR(1 − δ)δφ (τ (1 + cr) − 2(1 − φ)pn) + βT (τ (cr − vδ − (1 − δ)cn) + 2(1 − δ)δφpn)
(1 − δ)τ2
Point E is defined by λ˘2 = 0 and λ˘4 = 0. Constraints (2.10) and (2.12) hold as equalities. Option E
must satisfy λ˘1(E) ≥ 0 and λ˘3(E) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
Solving equations (A.8) and (A.9) along with equations (2.10) and (2.12), we can obtain the expres-
sions for λ˘1(E) and λ˘3(E) as the following.
λ˘1(E) = −βR (1 + cr − 2(pn − δφ))
λ˘3(E) = − (1 − δ)β
R((1 + cr − 2(pn − δφ)) + βT (cr − (1 − δ)cn − δ (2(pn − 1) + v))
δ(1 − δ)
Point F is defined by λ˘1 = 0, λ˘3 = 0, λ˘4 = 0 and constraint (2.11) holds as an equality. Option F
must satisfy λ˘2(F) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
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We can obtain the expression for λ˘2(F) as follows.
λ˘2(F) = −β
T (cr − vδ − (1 − δ)cn)
δ(1 − δ)
Point G is defined by λ˘1 = 0, λ˘2 = 0, λ˘3 = 0 and λ˘4 = 0. Solving equations (A.8) and (A.9), we can
obtain the expression for pGr and f
G.
Point H is defined by λ˘1 = 0, λ˘2 = 0 and λ˘4 = 0. Constraint (2.12) holds as an equality. Option H
must satisfy λ˘3(H) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
We can obtain the expression for λ˘3(H) as follows.
λ˘3(H) = −β
T (cr − (1 − δ)cn − δ (2(pn − 1) + v))
δ(1 − δ)
Point I is defined by λ˘1 = 0 and λ˘2 = 0. Constraints (2.12) and (2.13) hold as equalities. Option I
must satisfy λ˘3(I) ≥ 0 and λ˘4(I) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
The expressions for λ˘3(I) and λ˘4(I) are as follows.
λ˘3(I) = −δβ
R (2(1 − pn) − (1 − δ)(1 − cr)) + (1 − δ)βT (cr − (1 − δ)cn − δ (2(pn − 1) + v))
δ(1 − δ)2
λ˘4(I) =
δβR (2(1 − pn) − (1 − δ)(1 − cr))
(1 − δ)2
Point J is defined by λ˘1 = 0, λ˘2 = 0 and λ˘3 = 0. Constraint (2.13) holds as an equality. Option J
must satisfy λ˘4(J) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
We can obtain the expression for λ˘4(J) as follows.
λ˘4(J) = −δβ
TβR (δ(cr − v) + (1 − δ)(2pn − cn − 1))
(1 − δ) ((1 − δ)βT + δβR)
Point K is defined by λ˘1 = 0 and λ˘3 = 0. Constraints (2.11) and (2.13) hold as equalities. Option K
must satisfy λ˘2(K) ≥ 0 and λ˘4(K) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
We can obtain the expressions for λ˘2(M) and λ˘4(K) as follows.
λ˘2(K) = −δβ
R (2pn − cn − 1)
(1 − δ)
λ˘4(K) =
(1 − δ)βT cn −
(
βT + βRδ
)
cr + δ
(
vβF + βR(2pn − 1)
)
δ(1 − δ)
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Appendix A4
Intermediate Return Policy
The KKT conditions are:
∂L˜
∂pr
=
∂Π˜
∂pr
+ (1 − δ)φλ˜1 − (1 − (1 − δ)φ)λ˜2 + λ˜3 = 0 (A.15)
∂L˜
∂ f
=
∂Π˜
∂ f
− (1 − δφ)λ˜1 + (δφ)λ˜2 + λ34 = 0 (A.16)
λ˜1((1 − δ)φpr − (1 − δφ) f ) = 0 (A.17)
λ˜2((1 − φ)pn − (1 − (1 − δ)φ)pr + δφ f ) = 0 (A.18)
λ˜3(pr − pn + δφ) = 0 (A.19)
λ˜4 f = 0 (A.20)
λ˜1, λ˜2, λ˜3, λ˜4 ≥ 0 and Constraints (2.15) – (2.17) hold (A.21)
Table A.3 Critical Values under Intermediate Return Policy
Point T-cons. Buy Expression
L Refurb. pr(L) = pn − δφ
f (L) = 2(1−δ)φ(pn−δφ)−v(1−δφ)+(1−φ)cr2(1−φ)δ+2(1−δ)
M Both pr(M) =
βRδφ(1−δφ)(1+cr)+βT (2(1−δφ)pn−(1−δφ)cn+cr)
2(βT +βRδφ(1−δφ))
f (M) = β
R(δφ(φ(1−δ)−v(1−δφ))+δφ(1−δφ)cr)+βT (φ(1−δ)(2pn−cn)−v+cr)
2(βF+βRδφ(1−δφ))
M′ Both pr(M′) =
βRδ(1−φ)φ(1+cr)+βT (vδ2φ2−(1−φ)cn+(1−φ)(1+δφ)cr+2(1−φ)pn)
2βRδ(1−φ)φ+2βT (1−φ+δφ−δφ2+δ2φ2)
f (M′) = 0
E′ Refurb. pr(E′) = pn − δφ
f (E′) = 0
Conditions under which option L, M, A through E are optimal under the intermediate return policy.
Point A is defined by λ˜3 = 0 and λ˜4 = 0. Constraints (2.15) and (2.16) hold as equalities. Option A
must satisfy λ˜1(A) ≥ 0 and λ˜2(A) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
λ˜1(A) and λ˜2(A) are determined by following expressions:
λ˜1(A) =
(1 − δ)βRδφ(1 − δ) (1 + cr − 2(1 − δφ)pn) + βF (cr − (1 − δ)cn − δv)
(1 − φ)(1 − δ)
λ˜2(A) =
βT (cr − (1 − δφ)cn)
δφ(1 − φ) +
βR(1 − δφ) (1 + cr − 2(1 − δφ)pn)
1 − φ
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Point B is defined by λ˜2 = 0 , λ˜3 = 0 and λ˜4 = 0. Constraint (2.15) holds as an equality. Option B
must satisfy λ˜1(B) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
λ˜1(B) is determined by the following equation:
λ˜1(B) =
δβT ((1 − φ)cr − (1 − δφ)v)
(1 − δ)(1 − φ)(1 − δφ)
Point C is defined by λ˜2 = 0 and λ˜4 = 0. Constraints (2.15) and (2.17) hold as equalities. Option C
must satisfy λ˜1(C) ≥ 0 and λ˜3(C) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
λ˜1(C) and λ˜3(C) are determined by the following expressions:
λ˜1(C) =
δβT ((1 − φ)cr − (1 − δφ)v)
(1 − δ)(1 − φ)(1 − δφ)
λ˜3(C) = −β
T (2δφ (1 − pn) − (1 − δφ)cn + cr) + βRδφ(1 − δφ) (1 + cr − 2(pn − δφ))
δφ(1 − δφ)
Point D is defined by λ˜1 = 0 , λ˜3 = 0 and λ˜4 = 0. Constraint (2.16) holds as an equality. Option D
must satisfy λ˜2(D) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
λ˜2(D) is given by:
λ˜2(D) =
βF
2
(vδφ + (1 − φ)(cr − cn)) + βTβRδφ ((1 − δφ)((1 − φ)(cr − 2pn) − δφv) − 1 + φ)
(1 − φ)(1 − δ)δφ (βT + βRφ2δ)
Point E is defined by λ˜1 = 0 and λ˜4 = 0. Constraints (2.16) and (2.17) hold as equalities. Option E
must satisfy λ˜2(E) ≥ 0 and λ˜3(E) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
λ˜2(E) and λ˜3(E) are given by:
λ˜2(E) =
βT ((1 − φ)((2(pn − 1) − cr)) + (1 − δφ)v)
φ(1 − φ)(1 − δ)
λ˜3(E) =
(1 − δ)βRδφ (2(pn − δφ) − (1 + cr)) + βT ((1 − δ)cn − cr − δ (2 − v − 2pn))
φδ(1 − δ)
Point L is defined by λ˜1 = 0, λ˜2 = 0 and λ˜4 = 0. Constraint (2.17) holds as an equality. Option L
must satisfy λ˜3(L) ≥ 0 to become optimal.
Solving equations (A.15) and (A.16), we can obtain the expression for λ˜3(L).
λ˜3(L) = −β
T (cr − (1 − δφ)cn + 2δφ (1 − pn)) + βRδφ(1 − δφ) (1 + cr − 2(pn − δφ))
δφ(1 − δφ)
Point M is defined by λ˜1 = 0, λ˜2 = 0, λ˜3 = 0 and λ˜4 = 0. Solving equations (A.15) and (A.16), we
can obtain the expressions for pMr and f
M, which are given in Table 4.
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Point D′ is defined by λ˜1 = 0, λ˜3 = 0 and constraints (2.16) and (2.18) hold as an equality. Option
D′ must satisfy λ˜2 ≥ 0 and λ˜4 ≥ 0 to become optimal.
Solving equations (A.15) and (A.16), we can obtain the expression for λ˜2(D′) and λ34(D
′) as follows,
where τ = 1 − φ + δφ and κ = δφ (τ + τcr − 2(1 − φ)pn).
λ˜2(D′) =
βT (τ(1 − φ) (cn − (1 + δφ)cr) − δφ2 (vδτ − 2(1 − δ)(1 − φ)pn)) − βR(1 − φ)κ
−δφ(1 − φ)τ2
λ˜4(D′) = −β
R(1 − δ)κ − βT ((1 − δ)τcn − τcr + δ (vτ − 2(1 − δ)φpn))
(1 − δ)(1 − φ)τ2
Point M′ is defined by λ˜1 = 0, λ˜2 = 0 and λ˜3 = 0. Constraint(2.18) holds as an equality. Option M′
must satisfy λ˜4 ≥ 0 to become optimal.
Solving equations (A.15) and (A.16), we can obtain the expression for λ34(M
′) as follows.
λ˜4(D′) = −β
FβRδ2φ ((1 − δ)φ − v(1 − δφ) + (1 − δφ)cr) − βF2δ (v + (1 − δ)φcn − cr − 2(1 − δ)φpn)
−βT (1 − δ) (1 − φ + δφ − δφ2 + δ2φ2) − (1 − δ)δ(1 − φ)φβR
Point E′ is defined by λ˜1 = 0, λ˜2 = 0 . Constraints (2.18) and (2.17) hold as an equality. Option E′
must satisfy λ˜3 ≥ 0 , λ˜4 ≥ 0 to become optimal.
Solving equations (A.15) and (A.16), we can obtain the expression forλ˜3(E′) and λ34(E
′) as follows,
where ρ = 2δφ + δφ2
(
−2 + δ(2 + v − 2φ) + 2δ2φ
)
.
λ˜3(E′) = −
βTδ
(
−v − 2δφ2 + vδφ + 2δ2φ2 + (1 − φ)cr + 2(1 − δ)φpn
)
(1 − δ)(1 − φ)
λ˜4(E′) = −β
R(δ(1 − φ)φ (1 + 2δφ + cr − 2pn)) − βT (ρ − (1 − φ)cn + (1 − φ)(1 + δφ)cr − 2δφ(1 − 2φ + φδ)pn)
−δ(1 − φ)φ
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Appendix A5
Proof of Theorem 1
PROOF. (i) If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, (1 − δφ)cn], then λˆ1(A) < 0.
(ii) If cr > max
[
(1 − δφ)cn + 2δφ(pn − 1), 2pn − 2δφ − 1], then λˆ3(C) < 0.
Proof of Theorem 2
PROOF. (i). If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, δv + (1 − δ)cn], then λ˘2(A) < 0. As 2(1 − δφ)pn − 1 >
2(pn − δφ) − 1, if cr < min [2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, δv + (1 − δ)cn], then point G will violate the lower bound
pn − δφ for pGr =
1 + cr
2
.
(ii). If cr > max
[
vδ + (1 − δ)cn, 1 − 2(1 − pn)1 − δ
]
, then vδ + (1 − δ)cn > (v − 2(1 − pn))δ + (1 − δ)cn,
so λ˘3(H) < 0 and λ˘3(I) < 0.
(iii). If cr > 2pn − 1 and cr > 2(pn − δφ) − 1, then λ˘2(E) < 0 and f (F) < 0. If pn < 1 − (1 − δ)φ,
then f (E) < 0.
(iv). From Assumption 5, if 2pn − cn − 1 > 0, then λ˘4(J) < 0 and λ˘2(K) < 0.
Proof of Theorem 3
PROOF. (i). If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, δv + (1 − δ)cn, 1 − δφcn] , then λ˜1(A) < 0 and λ˜2(A) < 0.
(ii). If cr > max
[
(1 − δφ)cn − 2δφ, 2(pn − δφ) − 1], then λ˜3(L) < 0 and λ˜3(C) < 0.
(iii). If
v
cr
>
1 − φ
1 − δφ , (1 − φ)cr < (1 − δφ)v, then λ˜1(B) < 0 and λ˜1(C) < 0.
(iv). If (1 − φ)cr − (1 − δφ)v > 2(1 − φ)(1 − pn), then λ˜2(E) < 0.
(v). As (1− δφ)((1−φ)(cr −2pn)− δφv)− (1−φ) < 0, if vδφ+ (1−φ)cr < (1−φ)cn, then λ˜2(D) < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1
PROOF. (i). If cr < min
[
2(1 − δφ)pn − 1, δv + (1 − δ)cn, (1 − δφ)cn], the Lagrangian multipliers
associated with point A will be negative under any return policy.
(ii) If cr > max
[
(1 − δφ)cn − 2δφ(1 − pn), 2pn − 1, (1 − δφ)v1 − φ + 2(1 − pn)
]
, the Lagrangian multi-
pliers associated with points C, L and E will be negative under any return policy.
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